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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I examine the association between politician ownership and accounting 
conservatism for a sample of S&P 1500 firms between 2005 and 2011. The contracting 
explanation predicts that politician owned firms adopt less conservative accounting because 
lenders are less concerned with downside default risk for these politically favored firms. The 
political costs explanation predicts that politician owned firms adopt more conservative financial 
reporting to shield allied politicians from voter scrutiny. I find that equity ownership by members 
of the U.S. House and Senate is associated with lower levels of conditional conservatism. This 
negative association is more pronounced among: (1) firms owned by local politicians, where 
there is a greater alignment between the interests of the politician and the firm, and (2) firms with 
long-term issuer credit ratings, for which debt market participants particularly value 
conservatism as a mechanism for conveying information on downside default risk. I also 
examine the relationship between politician ownership and unconditional conservatism and fail 
to document a statistical relationship between the two constructs. Collectively, the results of my 
thesis provide consistent evidence of a lower contracting demand for conditional conservatism 
among politician owned firms.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies investigating the impact of government participation in financial markets on 
financial reporting document a negative association between government ownership and 
conservatism. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) show that firms in countries characterized by high 
state ownership speed recognition of good news and delay recognition of bad news due to 
possible government interference, and Chen et al. (2010) find that Chinese state owned 
enterprises adopt less conservative accounting because lenders are less concerned about the 
downside default risk of these politically favored firms. However, these studies do not consider 
how politicians’ participation in financial markets as private investors, rather than as public 
officials, affects accounting conservatism. Motivated by mounting anecdotal and empirical 
evidence of a political nexus between politicians and the firms in which they invest (Ziobrowski 
et al. 2004, 2011; Schwiezer 2011; Eggers and Hainmueller 2013; Tahoun 2013; Tahoun and van 
Lent 2013), I examine the relation between the equity holdings of members of the U.S. House 
and Senate and financial reporting conservatism for a sample of S&P 1500 firms.
1
 
Ex-ante, the direction of the association (if any) between politician ownership and 
conservative financial reporting is unclear. One possibility is that politician ownership reduces 
the contracting demand for conservatism. As an important contracting party to the firm, lenders 
demand conservatism as assurance that the minimum amount of net assets will be sufficient to 
repay the contracted sum. Lenders’ demand for conservative reporting increases with the 
                                                          
1
 The literature defines accounting conservatism as either taking a conditional or unconditional form. Conditional 
conservatism (e.g. impairment accounting) is the higher verifiability for recognizing good news as gains than for 
recognizing bad news as losses after difficult-to-verify news occurs (Basu 1997). The ultimate effect of conditional 
conservatism is to bias net assets and earnings downwards. Unconditional conservatism (e.g. excessive depreciation) 
also addresses difficult-to-verify news and biases net assets and earnings downwards, but it is applied before 
difficult-to-verify news occurs (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Beaver and Ryan 2005). As explained more fully in 
Section 3.2, I primarily focus on the conditional form for the purposes of this paper.  
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likelihood that the borrower will have insufficient net assets to cover its loans (Watts 2003). 
Lenders may be less concerned about the downside default risk of politician owned firms (POFs) 
because they obtain economic benefits from their political ties (Tahoun 2013) and are, thus, less 
likely to be in financial distress. If the politically favored POFs do get into financial trouble, they 
can obtain government funds with relative ease (Tahoun and van Lent 2013).
2
 Lenders may 
factor these implicit advantages into their assessment of downside default risk, leading to a lower 
demand for conservatism (as in Chen et al. 2010 who examine Chinese state owned firms).  
An alternative hypothesis, based on the political costs explanation of conservatism, posits 
that equity ownership subjects politicians to voter scrutiny, resulting in a greater demand for 
conservatism among POFs.
3
 In particular, prior research argues that politicians are more 
susceptible to voter criticism when bad news is not incorporated into financial statements than 
when good news is not incorporated (Watts 2003; Guay and Verrecchia 2006). Voters value 
timely loss recognition because overstatements of income and assets can generate large financial 
and employments losses (Watts 2003). Since voters lack the sophistication to unravel managers’ 
tendency to bias accounting numbers upwards, they expect individuals overseeing financial 
markets (i.e. standard-setters, regulators, and politicians) to provide this financial discipline 
(Guay and Verrecchia 2006). When voters learn of losses from overstated assets and income, 
they are likely to take their anger out, in part, on politicians. As equity ownership provides voters 
an identifiable link between politicians and firms, politicians bare particularly high political costs 
from the actions of POFs. Conservatism reduces the political costs incurred by politicians 
                                                          
2
 There is considerable evidence of political interference in recent government bailouts. Several studies find that 
politically connected banks received preferential access to government assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) (Duchin and Sosyura 2012; Blau et al. 2013; Tahoun and van Lent 2013). During the 2012 
elections, Presidential candidate Mitt Romney faced criticism for personally gaining $15.3 million as an investor of 
Delphi Corporation, an auto parts maker, which benefited from the bailout of General Motors in 2008. 
3
 Political costs are generally discussed in the context of firms and their accounting choices (Watts and Zimmerman 
1978; 1986). In this paper, I focus on the political costs incurred by politicians rather than firms.   
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because voters value its ability to offset managerial bias in financial reporting (Watts 2003). 
Thus, politicians potentially demand conservatism from POFs in order to satisfy constituents.  
To help distinguish between these competing explanations, I examine the association 
between politician ownership and conservatism using a sample of non-financial S&P 1500 firms 
over the period 2005-2011. I obtain data on politicians’ equity holdings from annual financial 
disclosure reports filed by members of the House and Senate. These disclosures report each 
member’s year-end holdings and a list of transactions executed throughout the year. I measure 
politician ownership as a binary variable equal to one if a firm’s shares are owned by at least one 
member of the U.S. House and Senate and conservatism based on Basu’s (1997) earnings-return 
model. I document a negative association between conservatism and the political ownership 
variable, consistent with lenders being less concerned about downside default risk for POFs. 
These results are robust to alternative measures of both politician ownership and conservatism.   
To provide corroborating evidence in support of the contracting explanation, I further 
partition POFs into those owned by a local politician (local POFs) and those not owned by a 
local politician (distant POFs). I consider a politician to be local to a firm if they reside over the 
congressional district in which the firm is headquartered. As the interests of politicians are 
inherently linked to firms domiciled in their district, politicians have particularly strong 
incentives to aid local POFs. For example, the financial press reports cases when politicians went 
as far as changing the text of legislation to provide ailing firms in their home state with 
government assistance (Paletta and Enrich 2009). I document a negative relation between 
conservatism and both local and distant ownership and find that the relation between local POF 
and conservatism is significantly more negative than the relation between distant POF and 
conservatism. These results are consistent with lenders incorporating the implicit advantages of 
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political connections into their assessment of downside default risk to a greater extent in the 
presence of a particularly strong link bonding the politician and firm.
 4
  
 Although the results from the above tests suggest that POFs are less conservative in their 
financial reporting, these tests do not explicitly link the results to a reduced debt contracting 
demand for conservatism. In additional analysis, I examine whether the relationship between 
politician ownership and conservatism varies by the presence or absence of debt market 
participants who value conservatism as a mechanism for assessing downside default risk. I use 
the existence of a long term issuer credit rating to capture the debt market’s interest in 
conservatism. Almost all firms with an issuer credit rating have public debt outstanding (Cantillo 
and Wright 2000; Rauh and Sufi 2010), and public bondholders have a greater demand for 
conservatism than other lenders because they have limited access to other monitoring 
mechanisms (Nikolaev 2010; Haw et al. 2013). In addition, credit rating agencies themselves are 
primarily interested in assessing downside default risk, and demand conservatism from rated 
firms (Bae et al. 2013). I find that the negative association between conservatism and politician 
ownership is more pronounced among rated firms. These results provide confirmatory evidence 
that lenders are responsible for driving down the demand for conservatism in POFs. 
 As a final test, I examine the association between political ownership and unconditional 
conservatism. The contracting explanation provides incentives for firms to provide conditional 
conservatism but not unconditional conservatism, because the latter does not employ new 
information that can generate contracting responses. The relation between the political costs 
explanation and conservatism is more ambiguous, as some prior research has argued that 
political costs provide incentives for firms to favor unconditional conservatism due to voters’ 
                                                          
4
 The political costs explanation would predict the association between politician ownership and conservatism 
should be less negative (or more positive) as politicians bear greater political costs from the actions of local firms. 
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aversion to large negative shocks (Qiang; 2007), while other have argued that voters’ primary 
objective is to constrain opportunistic managerial behavior, which can best be achieved through 
conditional conservatism (Watts; 2003). I find no association between politician ownership and 
unconditional conservatism, and therefore no evidence for the political costs explanation driving 
the demand for conservatism. 
This thesis contributes to three streams of research. First, this thesis contributes to the 
literature on ownership characteristics and accounting conservatism. Economic explanations for 
differences in conservatism among firms in prior studies typically focus on variation in agency 
and governance issues arising from different ownership structures (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 
2005; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Lafond and Roychowdhury 
2008; Nichols et al. 2009; Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012). My thesis adds to the literature by 
examining how variation in political connections arising from ownership structure impact 
accounting conservatism. These findings complement Chen et al. (2010), which finds that 
Chinese state owned firms adopt less conservative accounting because lenders are less concerned 
with downside default risk. By focusing my analysis on U.S. firms, I am not only able to 
examine politicians’ participation in capital markets as private investors rather than as public 
officials, I am also able to show that political ties influence accounting outcomes even in an 
institutional setting characterized by strong enforcement mechanisms, public disclosure of 
political connections, and a lack of government owned banks. 
Second, this thesis contributes to the literature on political connections and financing, 
which documents that connected firms receive preferential access to finance (Johnson and Mitton 
2003; Cull and Xu 2005; Dinc 2005; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Claessens et al. 2008). Chaney et 
al. (2011) link this finding to financial reporting and show that politically connected firms devote 
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less time to accurately portraying accruals because they are shielded from the capital market 
consequences of reporting low quality earnings to the debt market. Building on this study, I 
focus on the relation between politician ownership and conservative reporting since the extant 
evidence suggests a clear link between political ties, the informational demands of debt market 
participants, and accounting conservatism.
 
More specifically, prior studies note that political ties 
are particularly valuable during periods of financial distress (Faccio et al. 2006; Duchin and 
Sosyura 2012; Blau et al. 2013; Tahoun and van Lent 2013) and conjecture that lenders may rely 
on an implicit guarantee from politicians that politically connected firms will have access to 
government funds in case of financial distress. My results provide support for this theory as 
lenders appear willing to forego the contracting benefits of conservatism for POFs.  
Third, this thesis contributes to the literature on the outcomes associated with politician 
participation in U.S. financial markets. A number of studies in economics and finance find that 
both politicians (Ziobrowski et al. 2004, 2011; Eggers and Hainmueller 2013) and firms (Tahoun 
2013; Tahoun and van Lent 2013) obtain economic benefits as a result of these relationships. I 
add to this literature by showing that these relationships also impact firms in their interactions 
with other capital market participants. Documenting this relationship is important because it 
sheds light on the potential substitutive role of political connections and accounting information.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature 
and Section 3 develops hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample and research design and 
Section 5 reports the main empirical results. Section 6 provides robustness tests and additional 
analyses, and Section 7 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I introduce extant research that is relevant to my dissertation. Two main 
themes are apparent in my work: accounting conservatism and political connections. The first 
part of the review (Section 2.2) describes how the literature defines conservatism, highlights the 
economic explanations put forth to explain the existence of conservatism, and analyzes the 
similarities and differences between the conditional and unconditional forms of conservatism. 
The second part of the review (Section 2.3) begins with a general discussion of the political 
connections literature in accounting, including the different measures used to capture political 
connections. This section concludes with a discussion of two related studies particularly germane 
to this thesis. The third and final part of this review (Section 2.4) introduces my empirical 
measure of political connections, and discusses relevant research in political science and finance 
using this measure. It concludes by tying this type of political connections measure to the 
literature on accounting conservatism.   
This chapter is intended to provide a review of the main themes of this paper, and thus 
subsequent chapters may introduce additional research that is important to the concepts being 
discussed in those particular chapters. This chapter is divided into five sections, including this 
introduction and a conclusion.  
2.2. Conservatism 
2.2.1. Definition 
 Watts (2003, pg. 207) defines conservatism as the “differential verifiability required for 
recognition of profits versus losses.” Application of conservative accounting policies results in a 
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higher degree of verification to recognize economic gains as accounting profits than to recognize 
economic losses as accounting losses. The greater the divergence in the verification requirement 
between gains and losses, the greater the level of conservatism. The most extreme form of 
conservatism would require that accounting reports “anticipate no profit, but anticipate all 
losses”  
 Watts (2003) explains that conservatism has persisted in accounting reports for centuries 
despite attempts by standard-setters and regulators to maintain accounting standards that are 
neutral, and not biased in any direction (i.e. as in conservatism, which imposes a downward bias 
on net income). Watts (2003) conjectures that accounting conservatism has persisted because it 
benefits financial statement users and advances four specific explanations (or sources of demand) 
for why conservatism exists: contracting, litigation, taxation, and political costs. Studies 
investigating these explanations exploit either time-series or cross-sectional variation to identify 
the effect of a particular explanation on accounting conservatism.   
2.2.2. Explanations of Conservatism 
Firms typically have contracts with various parties, including debt holders, equity 
investors, as well as suppliers and customers. The contracting explanation posits that because 
conservatism counteracts firms’ incentives for aggressive accounting, it lowers potential losses 
for parties who use accounting numbers in contracts. 
While recent research has documented some evidence consistent with equity investors 
(Ahmed and Duellman 2007; LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; LaFond and Watts 2008; 
Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012; Kim et al. 2013) and customers and suppliers (Hui et al. 2012) 
valuing the contracting benefits of conservatism, the most comprehensive and convincing 
evidence of the contracting explanation comes from the debt markets. Nikolaev (2010) notes 
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conservative financial reporting enhances the efficiency of debt contracting in two ways. First, 
by incorporating negative economic news in a timely fashion, it facilitates the early transfer of 
decision rights to lenders and, therefore, mitigates the agency costs of debt. Second, by reducing 
the signalling costs associated with covenant use, it facilities contracting on covenants. 
Consistent with this contracting role, prior research finds more conservatism in institutional 
settings with significant benefits to lenders (Ahmed et al. 2002; Ball et al. 2008; Beatty et al. 
2008; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Zhang 2008; Nikolaev 2010; Haw et al. 2013; Tan 2013).  
 Watts (2003) argues shareholder litigation also provides another source of demand for 
conservatism. Shareholder class action lawsuits are extremely costly events for firms and their 
auditors. Firms often bear the full extent of these costs, as auditors can pass on their litigation 
costs by limiting the aggressiveness of accounting choices managers make, increasing auditing 
fees (Pratt and Stice 1994), issuing unfavorable audit opinions, or terminating relations with 
risky clients (Krishnan and Krishnan 1997). Firms can minimize expected litigation costs by 
applying conservative accounting since early recognition of economic losses reduces the 
probability of class action lawsuits (Kellogg 1984). Thus, the litigation explanation posits that 
because there is asymmetry in litigation costs (i.e. delayed recognition of economic losses is 
more likely to produce litigation costs than delayed recognition of economic profits), 
conservatism is observed in practice because it helps to reduce expected litigation costs. 
Consistent with this explanation, prior research finds more conservatism in institutional settings 
where the expected litigation costs are high (Basu 1997; Ball et al. 2000; Holthausen and Watts 
2001; Lang et al. 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Qiang 2007; 
Chung and Wynn 2008).  
10 
 
 The taxation explanation of conservatism argues that firms have incentives to report 
conservatively due to the links between taxation and accounting. Accelerated accounting 
recognition of losses and delayed accounting recognition of gains allows profitable firms to 
reduce the present value of taxes, and therefore increase the value of the firm (Watts 2003). 
While there have been limited tests of this explanation, the evidence we do have is consistent 
with conservatism existing, in part, because it helps firms to defer taxes (Basu 2005; Qiang 
2007).  
 The final explanation, titled the political costs or regulatory explanation of conservatism, 
posits that the political process provides standard-setters, regulators, and politicians (hereafter 
‘politicians’) with incentives to prefer conservative accounting. Watts (1977) argues that losses 
from overstated income are more observable and useable in the political process than foregone 
gains due to understated income. Watts (1977) elaborates that losses due to actions are more 
visible than losses due to inactions. When firms fail, it is relatively easy to argue ex post that 
assets were overvalued. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to observe any losses from 
undervaluation.  To avoid blame from their constituents, politicians have an incentive to respond 
to constituent demand for conservatism. In turn, firms have an incentive to provide conservative 
accounting, to avoid negative interactions with politicians. Empirical evidence consistent with 
this explanation can be found in Sivakumar and Waymire (2003), Qiang (2007) and Kong et al. 
(2013).  
2.2.3. Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism 
The literature defines accounting conservatism as either taking a conditional or 
unconditional form. Conditional conservatism (e.g. impairment accounting) is the higher 
verifiability for recognizing good news as gains than for recognizing bad news as losses after 
11 
 
difficult-to-verify news occurs (Basu 1997). The ultimate effect of conditional conservatism is to 
bias net assets and earnings downwards. Unconditional conservatism (e.g. accelerated 
depreciation) also addresses difficult-to-verify news and biases net assets and earnings 
downwards, but it is applied before difficult-to-verify news occurs (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; 
Beaver and Ryan 2005). While the conditional form utilizes (and reveals) information when 
received in future periods, the unconditional form only utilizes information at the inception of an 
asset’s life. The two forms of conservatism are also negatively related, as Beaver and Ryan 
(2005) demonstrate that unconditional conservatism (e.g. accelerated depreciation) lowers net 
assets, thereby reducing subsequent conditional conservatism (e.g. impairment accounting). In 
other words, if accounting depreciation on assets is accelerated relative to the true underlying 
economic depreciation, assets are less likely to be written down in the future under impairment 
accounting. Thus, application of unconditional conservatism can pre-empt the need to apply 
conditional conservatism. 
Qiang (2007) examines the distinct, common, and interrelated roles of the two forms of 
conservatism as it relates to the four explanations put forth by Watts (2003). She demonstrates 
that taxation provides incentives for firms to record expenses and losses as early as possible, and 
therefore induces unconditional rather than conditional conservatism. This is also intuitively 
appealing as U.S. tax law allows for additional deductions relating to adoption of unconditionally 
conservative policies (e.g. use of LIFO) but not conditionally conservative policies (e.g. 
impairments). The contracting explanation provides incentives for firms to provide conditionally 
conservative accounting because it employs new information that can generate contracting 
responses, resulting in greater contracting efficiency. Ex-ante, it provides more accurate 
information for loan pricing and ex-post, it allows for more timely covenant violations and 
12 
 
transfer of decision rights to lenders. In contrast, because unconditional conservatism does not 
employ any new information, it decreases (or does not impact) contracting efficiency, if the bias 
is unknown (known). Prior research examining the contracting explanation almost exclusively 
focuses on the conditional form of conservatism  (Ahmed et al. 2002; Ball et al. 2008; Beatty et 
al. 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Zhang 2008; Nikolaev 2010; Haw et al. 2013; Tan 2013). 
The form of conservatism induced by the other two explanations is more ambiguous. For 
the litigation explanation, Qiang (2007) argues that firms can best minimize expected litigation 
costs by recognizing bad news as early as possible. Thus, like the taxation explanation, it may 
induce unconditional conservatism, as this form recognizes economic losses earlier than 
conditional conservatism. However, it is possible that some plaintiffs prefer the conditional form 
due to its contracting benefits, suggesting that litigation may induce both forms of conservatism.  
The form of conservatism induced by the political costs explanation is also ambiguous. On the 
one hand, Qiang (2007) argues that voters (and therefore politicians) are averse to large negative 
shocks associated with conditional conservatism and prefer the smooth asset value decreases 
associated with unconditional conservatism. On the other hand, to the extent that voters are 
primarily motivated by a desire to constrain opportunistic managerial behavior (Watts 2003), 
they may favor conditional conservatism as unconditional conservatism can induce myopic 
managerial investment decisions (LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008). More specifically, 
conditional conservatism can help to discipline firms’ investment decisions by giving managers 
less incentives to undertake ex-ante negative NPV projects and greater incentives to abandon ex-
post loss projects. 5 Unconditional conservatism potentially gives managers incentives to avoid 
                                                          
5
 Conditional conservatism also reduces managers’ incentives and ability to overstate earnings by penalizing 
managers for losses immediately while deferring reward for gains until realized. 
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positive NPV projects by penalizing earning immediately for full costs while fully deferring any 
benefits, irrespective of whether the investment has positive or negative NPV.  
2.3. Political Connections and Accounting 
2.3.1. Survey of Literature 
 There is a growing literature examining the influence of political connections on 
accounting outcomes. Papers in this stream of research differ on a number of dimensions, most 
notably in measurement of political connections, the specific attribute of accounting information 
examined, and the theory put forth to explain the pattern of results documented. 
 Empirical proxies used to measure political connections in the U.S. include the past 
political experience of board members (Kim and Zhang 2014), campaign contributions (Correia 
2014), and lobbying expenditures (Yu and Yu 2011; Kong et al. 2013). In an Indonesian setting, 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) use cumulative stock returns over six events indicating the 
President’s health was declining to measure political connections, while in a cross-country 
sample, Chaney et al. (2011) employ a measure based on whether at least one of its large 
shareholders (anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or top directors 
(CEO, COB, President, Vice-President, or Secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or a 
head of state, or is tightly related (e.g. family, friend) to a politician or political party. 
 The specific accounting attribute examined also differs across studies. Some studies focus 
on relatively aggressive outcomes, such as securities class action lawsuits (Yu and Yu 2011), 
SEC enforcement outcomes (Correia 2014), and tax aggressiveness (Kim and Zhang 2014). 
Other studies focus on more general measures of financial reporting quality, including the 
variability of discretionary accruals (Chaney et al. 2010) and accounting conservatism (Kong et 
al. 2013). Collectively, this literature demonstrates that political connections lead to lower 
reporting quality. The theories put forth to explain this general result typically focus on the costs 
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associated with reporting poor quality accounting information, with the papers arguing that 
politically connected firms face lower detection risk (Yu and Yu 2011; Correia 2014; Kim and 
Zhang 2014) and capital market consequences (Chaney et al. 2011) .  
2.3.2. Related Studies 
  The two studies that are most similar to this thesis are Chaney et al. (2011) and Kong et 
al. (2013). Using a cross-country sample, Chaney et al. (2011) provide evidence that managers of 
politically connected firms devote less time to accurately portraying accruals (as measured by the 
standard deviation of unexplained accruals) because politicians shield these managers from the 
capital market consequences of reporting low quality accounting information. Given that U.S. 
firms make up a trivial fraction of Chaney et al. (2011)’s sample, it is unclear whether their 
results generalize to a setting characterized by strong enforcement mechanisms, public disclosure 
of political connections, and a lack of government owned banks. Chaney et al. (2011) also do not 
focus on a directional bias in financial reporting, as they use the variability in discretionary 
accruals as their measure of reporting quality. Building on this study, I focus on the relation 
between politician connections and accounting conservatism (which induces a negative bias) 
since the extant evidence suggests a clear link between political ties, the informational demands 
of firm stakeholders, and accounting conservatism.  
Kong et al. (2013) also examine the relation between political connections (as measured 
by lobbying expenditures) and accounting conservatism for a sample of U.S. firms. Their most 
reliable result suggests that firms that are both politically connected and highly visible have 
higher levels of both conditional and unconditional conservatism. Their results for politically 
connected firms that are not highly visible vary between having a positive, no, or negative 
relation with conservatism, depending on how the authors measure conservatism. In contrast to 
this study, I examine the relation between political connections and accounting conservatism 
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using the complete framework articulated in Watts (2003). I also incorporate the political 
connections literature in finance, which argues that political ties are particularly valuable during 
periods of financial distress (Faccio et al. 2006; Duchin and Sosyura 2012; Blau et al. 2013; 
Tahoun and van Lent 2013) and conjecture that lenders may rely on an implicit guarantee from 
politicians that politically connected firms will have access to government funds in case of 
financial distress. More specifically, I consider how both the contracting and political costs 
explanations can explain differences in conservatism among politically connected and non-
politically connected firms, and provide economic rationale for why there may be observed 
differences in how each of these explanations influence conditional and unconditional 
conservatism. Finally, as I articulate in the next section, my politician ownership based measure 
of political connections has a number of advantages relative to the lobbying measure used in 
Kong et al. (2013). In sum, I view my hypotheses as being more theory-grounded and my 
evidence as complementing and adding to the evidence provided in Kong et al. (2013). 
2.4. Political Ownership Based Measure of Political Connections 
 In this thesis, I use the presence of equity investment by standing members of the U.S. 
House and Senate to measure political connections. My use of politician ownership as a measure 
of political connections is motivated by research in political economics which finds that self-
interested politicians make decisions based on a number of (often competing) considerations, 
including: (1) the economic interests of their constituents, (2) special interests, (3) and their own 
personal wealth interests (Mian et al. 2010; Tahoun and van Lent 2013). As politicians 
disproportionately invest in local and contributing firms (Eggers and Hainmueller 2013), an 
ownership based measure of connections provides a rare opportunity to identify congruence 
between a firm and politician across all three dimensions. In contrast, other possible measures 
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based on campaign contributions, lobbying expenditures, or board connections capture only a 
subset of factors that impact politician decision-making.   
 Research in political science and finance provides evidence to support the notion of a 
political nexus between politicians and firms in which they invest. These studies find that both 
politicians and firms benefit as a result of these relationships. For politicians, the benefits come 
in the form of abnormal returns on their equity portfolio (Ziobrowski et al. 2004, 2011; 
Schwiezer 2011). For firms, the benefits come in the form of preferential access to government 
contracts (Tahoun 2013) and bailouts (Tahoun and van Lent 2013).  
 Finally, there is research to support that government participation in financial markets 
influences financial reporting, and more specifically conditional conservatism. Studies 
investigating the impact of government participation in financial markets on financial reporting 
document a negative association between government ownership and conservatism. Bushman 
and Piotroski (2006) show that firms in countries characterized by high state ownership speed 
recognition of good news and delay recognition of bad news due to possible government 
interference, and Chen et al. (2010) find that Chinese state owned enterprises adopt less 
conservative accounting because lenders are less concerned about the downside default risk of 
these politically favored firms. I extend this line of research by considering how politicians’ 
participation in financial markets as private investors, rather than as public officials, affects 
accounting conservatism.  
2.5. Conclusions 
In summary, this chapter reviews research that investigates the various explanations for 
the existence of accounting conservatism: contracting, litigation, taxation, and political costs. It 
also distinguishes between the two forms of conservatism, conditional and unconditional, and 
examines the interaction between these two forms and the four explanations of conservatism. 
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This chapter also reviews extant literature on the relation between political connections and 
accounting outcomes. Almost all studies in this review, irrespective of how they measure 
political connections or financial reporting quality, find that politically connected firms have 
lower financial reporting quality. However, researchers have yet to comprehensively consider 
whether (and in what direction) political connections induce conservatism in financial reports. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of research in political science and finance that 
demonstrates that U.S. politicians are politically connected to the firms in which they invest in. 
Given the paucity of evidence on the accounting implication of politician participation in 
financial markets, and the strong theoretical basis on which to make predictions on how political 
connections influence accounting conservatism, this appears to be a fruitful avenue for financial 
reporting research.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter develops testable hypotheses that build on the themes reviewed in the 
previous chapter. The chapter begins by describing the structure of the hypotheses, which is 
necessitated by the fact that politician ownership can potentially influence conservatism through 
two channels, and can also potentially influence both conditional and unconditional 
conservatism. In Section 3.2, I describe that the hypothesis primarily focus on conditional 
conservatism, as there is strong theoretical support to justify this choice.   
Section 3.3 of this chapter relates politician ownership to conditional conservatism, 
utilizing both the contracting and political costs explanations. Hypothesis 1 is premised on 
providing evidence to bear on which of these competing explanations holds in this setting. 
Section 3.4 expands on this comparison and presents H2 with the objective of providing further 
evidence to support the evidence documented in H1. Section 3.5 develops a hypothesis to 
directly test the contracting explanation in this setting, using cross-sectional variation in the 
extent to which firms are affected by the contracting explanation of conservatism. Section 3.6 
provides an indirect test of the political costs explanation in this setting by incorporating the 
unconditional form of conservatism. Section 3.6 concludes with a summary of the chapter.  
3.2. Structure of Hypothesis Tests 
 In the previous chapter, I discuss four possible explanations that drive the demand for 
conservatism. As described more fully below, cross-sectional variation in politician ownership, 
and political connections more broadly, may impact the contracting and/or political costs based 
demand for conservatism. On the other hand, I am not aware of any evidence that suggests that 
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POFs have a different exposure to shareholder litigation or taxation based demands for 
conservatism, and therefore do not incorporate these explanations into the hypothesis 
development. Where appropriate, I control for these explanations as part of my research design. 
The previous chapter also discussed the two forms of conservatism and the implications 
of each of the explanations for conditional and unconditional conservatism. The contracting 
explanation is expected to influence only the demand for conditional conservatism, while the 
political costs explanation can influence the demand for either conditional or unconditional 
conservatism. Since conditional conservatism has the potential to be impacted by both 
explanations, I primarily focus on conditional conservatism in H1-H3, and supplement these 
hypotheses with a hypothesis related to unconditional conservatism in H4.  
3.3. Political Ownership and Conditional Conservatism  
3.3.1. Contracting Demand for Conditional Conservatism 
Lenders primary motivation in demanding conditional conservatism is to ensure that the 
borrower has a minimum amount of net assets to repay the contracted sum. Thus, across firms, 
lenders demand for conservative reporting increases with the likelihood that the borrower will 
have insufficient net assets to cover its loans (Watts 2003). For example, debt market participants 
demand more conservative financial reports from borrowers with higher downside default risk, 
including borrowers that have greater bondholder-shareholder conflicts (Ahmed et al. 2002), 
lower levels of private lender monitoring (Nikolaev 2010), and covenant violations (Tan 2013).  
 Lenders may be less concerned about the downside default risk of POFs for several 
reasons. First, politically connected firms derive economic benefits from their political ties, in 
the form of preferential access to government contracts (Goldman et al. 2013; Tahoun 2013) and 
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protection from competition, taxes, and regulation (Hansen et al. 2005).
6,7
 As a result of these 
political favors, POFs tend to be more profitable and less likely to be financially distressed.
8
 
Lenders may factor these implicit advantages into their assessment of default risk, leading to a 
lower demand for conservatism.
9
 Second, if POFs find themselves in financial trouble, they can 
look to their political allies for ex post financial assistance. In particular, a number of studies 
document that politically connected firms, including POFs, are more likely to receive 
government bailouts during periods of financial distress (Faccio et al. 2006; Duchin and Sosyura 
2012; Blau et al. 2013; Tahoun and van Lent 2013).
10
 Political pressure and intervention on 
behalf of POFs may act as an insurance mechanism against extreme events, mitigating the need 
for lenders to demand conservatism from POFs. Third, lenders may grant favors to POFs, such as 
allowing them to report less conservatively, as a means to build up their own political 
                                                          
6
 As a specific example, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) has on three separate occasions faced allegations of 
conflicts of interest in granting government contracts to companies owned by her husband, Richard C. Blum. From 
2001 to 2005, Senator Feinstein chaired a subcommittee which granted military contracts worth over $1.5 billion to 
URS Corporation and Perini, both partially owned by her husband.. In April 2009, the Washington Times reported 
that Senator Feinstein intervened on behalf of the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to direct $25 
billion of TARP funds to the agency. FDIC had recently awarded CB Richard Ellis Group, a company in which 
Richard Blum served as board chairman, a lucrative government contract. In November 2009, Senator Feinstein and 
her husband invested $1 million into Amyris Biotechnologies; several weeks later, Amyris received a $24 million 
grant from the Department of Energy. For details: http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/06/06/Dianne-
Feinstein-Still-Dogged-by-Allegations-of-Conflicts-of-Interest 
7
 In November 2009, the Washington Post reported that when legislation was proposed to impose a $4 billion tax on 
medical service firms to help offset the costs of health-care reforms, both Senator John Kerry (D-MA) and 
Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) spoke out against the proposal. As the Washington Post noted, this 
shared opposition was noteworthy because the two politicians were ideologically juxtaposed, but both had millions 
invested in firms that make medical devices. For details: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-11-
23/politics/36914935_1_medical-devices-lawmakers-medical-device 
8
 In fact, a large and growing literature finds that politically connections have a positive effect on firm value (e.g. 
Roberts 1990; Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006; Faccio and Parsley 2009; Goldman et al. 2009; and Cooper et al. 2010). 
9
 Houston et al. (2012) provide evidence that U.S. lenders offer politically connected firms contracting arrangements 
(in the form of restrictions and covenants) which incorporate their lower downside default risk. 
10
 As a specific example, Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) arranged for a series of meetings in late 2008 
between the Department of Treasury and OneUnited Bank, a firm in which she and her husband had an ownership 
stake. The Chief Executive Officer of OneUnited used the meeting as a platform to ask for bailout funds under 
TARP; in December 2008, OneUnited secured $12.1 million in bailout funds from the federal government. For 
details: http://www.businessinsider.com/the-most-corrupt-members-of-congress-2009-9#rep-maxine-waters-d-ca-14   
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connections.
11
 Political connections are valuable to lenders in securing bailouts, receiving 
priority in bankruptcy proceedings of borrowers, and obtaining government contracts.
 12,13   
The above discussion suggests that lenders will be less concerned with downside default 
risk for POFs. As a result, the demand for conditionally conservative reporting, incorporated in 
debt contracts, will be weaker for POFs than for non-POFs.  
3.3.2. Political Costs Demand for Conditional Conservatism 
In contrast to the negative association predicted by the contracting explanation, the 
political costs explanation predicts a positive association between politician ownership and 
conditional conservatism. Politicians face asymmetric costs associated with incorporating bad 
news versus good news into financial reports (Watts 2003; Guay and Verrecchia 2006). 
Specifically, politicians are more susceptible to voter criticism when bad news is not 
incorporated into financial statements than when good news is not incorporated. Voters learn of 
delayed loss recognition when instances of overstated assets and income are revealed. Voter 
scrutiny will be particularly high when politicians have traceable links to firms overstating assets 
and income, as is the case when politicians invest in particular firms.
14 
 Conservatism reduces the 
                                                          
11
While the U.S. does not have government owned banks, politicians may still be able to influence the behavior of 
lenders because lenders are also regulated by the same politicians that borrowers are politically connected with. For 
example, In February 1990, it was reported that a consortium of banks, heading by Huntington National Bank, 
issued a $3.5 million loan to a private, nonprofit group Hameroff/Milenthal/Spence to sponsor a Chinese exhibition 
in Ohio. It was alleged that the group obtained financing simply because of close political ties between the group’s 
Chairman David Milenthal and Governor Richard Celeste (Business First – Columbus, February 12, 1990).   
12
 The controversy surrounding the Chrysler reorganization helps to highlight the risk for creditors of not being 
politically connected. Bankruptcy law generally requires that a debtor’s senior creditors be repaid, in full, before its 
junior creditors receive anything. In the case of Chrysler, the government controlled the reorganization, and granted 
the politically powerful United Auto Workers (UAW) labor union (a junior creditor) priority over the other (senior) 
creditors. While UAW received majority ownership of Chrysler, $1.5 billion in cash and a $4.6 billion note, the 
remaining creditors received only $2 billion of the $6.9 billion they were owed (or $0.29 for every $1.00 owed) For 
details: http://capitalresearch.org/2010/07/the-auto-industry-bailout-how-the-shrinking-uaw-buys-influence/ 
13
 Butler et al. (2009) find political connections can help banks obtain underwriting contracts in municipal bonds. As 
specific examples, see: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111170689163689225,00.html 
14
 In 2002, the Wall Street Journal reported of the close, personal ties (including stock holdings) between then 
President George W. Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney and Kenneth Lay, CEO and Chairman of Enron. Voters 
were angered by the Enron scandal and the Wall Street Journal urged, “let’s not let the politicians off the hook; 
they’re culpable too”. For details: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1011226990470237760.html  
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political costs incurred by politicians because voters value its ability to offset managerial bias in 
financial reporting (Watts 2003). Therefore, politicians potentially demand conservative 
financial reporting from POFs to satisfy constituents.    
The political costs explanation is a joint test of the following assumptions: (1) voters can 
observe (ex post) which firms have overstated assets and income; (2) overstated assets and 
income anger voters; (3) angry voters will impose costs on politicians when they observe 
instances of overstated assets and income; and (4) voters are aware of firm-politician affiliations 
and impose higher costs on affiliated politicians. To elaborate on the arguments put forth by 
Watts (2003) and Guay and Verrecchia (2006), I discuss each of these assumptions in turn.
15
  
The information voters use to make voting decisions is often obtained from the media (e.g., 
Watts 1977; Guay 2010; Bonaparte and Kumar 2013). The media is thus an important 
information intermediary and fulfills two primary roles. In its rebroadcasting role, the media 
disseminates information generated by other information intermediaries (Miller 2006). Since 
accounting scandals discovered by auditors, analysts, or regulators typically involve the 
overstatement of assets and income (e.g., Feroz et al. 1991; Palmrose et al. 2004), the media 
rebroadcasts information on firms with overstated assets and income. In its information role, the 
media undertakes original investigation and analysis. In this role, the media initiates coverage on 
firms with questionable accounting practices which benefit management (Miller 2006). Since 
managers generally have incentives to overstate, rather than understate, assets and income, the 
                                                          
15
  Zhang (2008) notes conservatism can be costly because it increases the likelihood of debt covenant violations, 
and imposes explicit (compensation) and implicit (labor market consequences) costs on managers. As long-term 
relationships with politicians are difficult to establish and politicians can offer valuable policy favors (Kroszner and 
Stratmann 1998), managers have incentives to make accounting choices that minimize political costs for politicians 
(Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010). Since politically active firms are under public scrutiny themselves, it is also in 
their best interest to adopt conservatism (Kong et al. 2013).
 
Thus, POF firm managers may supply conservatism with 
the dual objective of minimizing political costs for themselves and their political allies.   
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media also provides voters with original information on firms with overstated assets and income. 
Through the media, voters can observe instances where firms have not been conservative. 
Voters are angered by overstated assets and income because these overstatements can 
generate large losses for voters (Watts 2003). In the extreme case, overstated assets and income 
can result in the dissolution of a firm. Since voters value greater employment (Schleifer and 
Vishny 1994), they will be angered by job cuts and lost pensions resulting from firm dissolution. 
Similarly, since voters are more active in equity markets than non-voters (Bonaparte and Kumar 
2013), they will be angered by the large financial losses they incur as a result of accounting 
scandals.
16
  In contrast, voters will not be as angered with losses arising from understated assets 
and income because these losses will not materially impact their personal welfare (Watts 1977).     
As voters lack the sophistication to unravel managers’ tendency to bias accounting 
numbers upwards, they expect individuals overseeing financial markets (i.e. standard-setters, 
regulators, and politicians) to provide this financial discipline (Guay and Verrecchia 2006). 
When voters learn of losses from overstated assets and income, they are likely to take their anger 
out, in part, on politicians (Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010). As noted in Ovtchinnikov and 
Pantaleoni (2012), voters can impose costs on politicians through organized protests, or the 
power of their wallet and/or vote. For example, voters may reduce contributions to politicians’ 
election campaigns. This will be costly to politicians as individual contributions represent the 
largest source of campaign financing and can influence election outcomes. Similarly, politicians’ 
electoral prospects can be adversely impacted by organized protests and lost votes.    
Voters can identify links between politicians and firms in a number of ways, including 
reports issued by financial analysts (Knight 2007), watchdog groups (i.e. Center for Political 
                                                          
16
 In light of the accounting scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, corporate accountability became a major 
election issue in the 2002 mid-term elections. To minimize voter ire, politicians moved quickly to enact reforms to 
securities laws (e.g.. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002) and pension and retirement rules.  
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Accountability), or the media (Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010).
17
 Voters will impose 
particularly high political costs on affiliated politicians because connections are taken to mean 
that the politician condones activities by the firm that generate losses for voters (Guay 2010).
 
 
3.3.3. Prediction 
In summary, POFs may have less conditionally conservative financial reporting if lenders 
are less concerned about downside default risk, or more conditionally conservative financial 
reporting if politicians demand conservative reporting to defend themselves against voter 
scrutiny. Of course, a third possibility is that politician ownership has no association with 
conditional conservatism. In particular, the relatively low economic magnitude of politician 
ownership documented in this and other studies (Eggers and Hainmueller 2013; Tahoun 2013) 
may reduce the efficacy of the political connection and lead to trivial differences in the behavior 
of lenders, politicians, and/or firm managers. As a result of these competing explanations, I make 
a non-directional prediction: 
 
H1: Ownership by politicians is associated with conditional conservatism.   
 
3.4. Strength of Politician-Firm Relationship and Conditional Conservatism 
 In the previous section, political ownership was discussed in general. However, 
perceptions by lenders and voters are likely to be shaped by the strength of the link between the 
investing politician and investee firm. One way of capturing the strength of the political 
connection is to further partition POFs into those owned by a local politician (local POFs) and 
those not owned by a local politician (distant POFs). This approach is particularly helpful in 
helping to further distinguish between the contracting and political costs explanations.   
                                                          
17
 On November 13, 2011, 60 minutes, a nationally televised news program, reported that several members of 
Congress used inside information to personally benefit their stock portfolios.  
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Prior research finds that politicians exert greater effort on initiatives that benefit the local 
constituency (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998) and, as a result, there is a tighter link between 
politicians and firms headquartered in his or her district (Roberts 1990; Faccio and Parsley 2009; 
Duchin and Sosyura 2012; Acemaglou et al. 2013; Eggers and Hainmueller 2013). This evidence 
suggests politicians should have stronger incentives to aid local firms, especially in periods of 
financial distress.
18
 Capital market participants are aware of the strength of these local ties 
(Roberts 1990; Faccio and Parsley 2009; Acemaglou et el. 2013), suggesting lenders are likely to 
be less concerned with the downside default risk of local POFs, and consequently, the negative 
relationship between politician ownership and conservatism predicted by the contracting 
explanation should be stronger for local POFs than distant POFs. Under the political costs 
explanation, voters are more likely to view local POFs as being politically connected to the 
investee firm, increasing the risk to the local politician of bearing political costs. Thus, the 
positive relationship between politician ownership and conservatism predicted by the political 
costs explanation should be stronger for local POFs than distant POFs.  
In sum, I expect the strength of the political connections to moderate the relationship 
between political ownership and conditional conservatism. Of course, the exact nature of this 
effect depends on the results of H1. If H1 produces a positive relation between politician 
ownership and conditional conservatism, I would expect the relationship to be significantly more 
positive for local POFs (to support the political costs explanation). If H1 produces a negative 
relation, I would expect the relationship to be significantly more negative for local POFs (to 
support the contracting explanation).  
                                                          
18
 As a specific example, 12 banks in Ohio received TARP funds after Ohio politicians complained about the federal 
government’s treatment of Ohio-based National City Corp. Regulators refused to provide government funds to the 
bank and subsequently forced it into a merger. Ohio’s congressional delegation lobbied on behalf of other Ohio 
banks and threatened to hold hearings outlining how the government had failed National City Corp if other Ohio-
based banks were not supported. For details: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123258284337504295  
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H2: The association between politician ownership and conditional conservatism is more 
pronounced for firms where investing politicians are local to the firm.   
 
3.5. Firm Contracting Environment and Conditional Conservatism 
 Another useful way to distinguish between the two competing explanations is to exploit 
differences across firms in the applicability of each of these explanations. Since the theory and 
empirical evidence relating to the contracting explanation is far more developed than that 
relating to the political costs explanation, I exploit cross-sectional variation in the applicability of 
the contracting explanation.
19
 The purpose of this hypothesis is to directly test the contracting 
explanation of conservatism in this setting.  
 Recent research finds that public bondholders have a greater demand for conservatism 
than other lenders because they have limited access to other monitoring mechanisms (Nikolaev 
2010; Haw et al. 2013). In particular, public bondholders have a greater demand for 
conservatism because, in contrast to private lenders, they lack timely inside information, have 
weaker incentives to monitor managers, and exercise less control over managers’ actions 
(Nikolaev 2010). In addition, credit rating agencies are primarily interested in assessing 
downside default risk, and demand conservatism from rated firms (Bae et al. 2013). If the 
contracting explanation holds in this setting, we should observe a negative relationship between 
politician ownership and conditional conservatism, and this relationship should be significantly 
                                                          
19
 To my knowledge, there are only two measures used to capture cross-sectional variation in the applicability of the 
political costs explanation for a broad sample of firms. Qiang (2007) uses market share to capture extent of political 
costs faced, and finds no relation with conditional conservatism, whereas Dhaliwal et al. (2014) find a positive 
association, and interpret this as consistent with market share capturing strategic incentives rather than political 
costs. The second measure, lobbying expenditures used by Kong et al. (2013), is more traditionally viewed as a 
measure of political connections, thereby precluding its inclusion in any cross-sectional analysis. 
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more negative for firms that interact with debt market participants that value the contracting 
benefits of conservatism.  
 
H3: The association between politician ownership and conditional conservatism is more 
pronounced for firms that interact with debt market participants that value the contracting 
benefits of conservatism.  
 
3.6. Politician Ownership and Unconditional Conservatism 
 Thus far, I have focused on the relation between politician ownership and conditional 
conservatism, with the objective of distinguishing between the contracting and political costs 
explanations. H1 offers a direct test of which of the explanations holds in this setting, while H2 
and H3 provide complimentary and confirmatory evidence. As a final test, I examine the 
association between politician ownership and unconditional conservatism.  
 As noted in the previous section, the contracting explanation provides incentives for 
firms to provide conditional conservatism but not unconditional conservatism, because the latter 
does not employ new information that can generate contracting responses. The relation between 
the political costs explanation and conservatism is more ambiguous, as some prior research has 
argued that political costs provides incentives for firms to favor unconditional conservatism due 
to voters aversion to large negative shocks (Qiang; 2007), while other have argued that voters 
primary objective is to constrain opportunistic managerial behavior, which can best be achieved 
through conditional conservatism (Watts; 2003). Nonetheless, documenting a positive 
association between politician ownership and unconditional conservatism would provide indirect 
evidence that would not be consistent with the contracting explanation.  
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H4: Ownership by politicians is positively associated with unconditional conservatism.   
 
3.7. Conclusions 
In this chapter I posit four hypotheses to be tested in subsequent empirical analyses. I 
present my first hypothesis in support of a relation between politician ownership and conditional 
conservatism. I present the next two hypotheses in support of an interaction between politician 
ownership and strength of ownership and contracting environment that affect conditional 
conservatism. I present my final hypothesis in support of a positive relation between politician 
ownership and unconditional conservatism.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I describe all aspects related to the empirical design of my sample and 
primary analysis. The chapter begins by describing the method for selecting my sample firms 
(Section 4.2) and follows with separate discussions of my selection and construction of proxies 
for politician ownership (Section 4.3) and conditional and unconditional conservatism (Section 
4.4). This chapter also presents the empirical models used to test Hypotheses 1 through 4 
(Section 4.5). Overall, this chapter includes seven sections, including this introduction and a 
conclusion.  
Section 4.2 outlines my sample selection criteria and primary sample period. Politician 
ownership data is hand-collected for S&P 1500 firms during the period 2005-2011. This design 
choice helps with comparisons to other studies in the literature, and balances the need for a 
reasonable sample size with the demands of hand-collection.   
  Section 4.3 describes the annual financial disclosure reports from which I obtain data on 
politician ownership. This section includes an example report, and provides descriptive statistics 
on the level of politician ownership in my sample firms, using multiple measures of ownership.  
 Section 4.4 provides rationale for my decision to use the Basu (1997) earnings-return 
model as a measure of conditional conservatism, and the Givoly and Hayn (2000) accruals based 
measure of unconditional conservatism.  
 Section 4.5 and 4.6 present two models, one to test Hypothesis 1 through 3, and a second 
model, to test Hypothesis 4. Both models are tested empirically using OLS methods. Section 4.7 
concludes the chapter. 
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4.2. Sample 
As in prior research (LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012), 
I focus on a sample of firms in the S&P 1500 index (S&P 500, S&P Mid Cap 400, and S&P 
Small Cap 600 indexes) covering the period 2005-2011. This design choice facilitates 
comparisons to others studies in the literature, and also reduces the extent of hand-collection of 
politician ownership data. I summarize the sample selection process in Panel A of Table 1. 
I begin with a sample of 10,555 firm-year observations in the S&P 1500 index during the 
2005-2011 period, as per ExecuComp. I remove 763 firm-year observations with missing 
Compustat data to compute net income, leverage, and market-to-book. I further remove 203 
firm-year observations with missing CRSP data on stock returns. Finally, I remove 1,609 firm-
year observations belonging to the financial industry (SIC 6000-6999), as the reporting 
incentives of financial firms is quite different from non-financial firms. The sample consists of 
7,980 firm-years from 1,540 firms in the S&P 1500 index covering the period 2005-2011. These 
are non-financial firms that have the required financial accounting data from Compustat and 
stock price data from CRSP. 
4.3. Measure of Politician Ownership  
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 requires members of Congress (as well as other 
government officials) to file annual reports disclosing their income, assets, liabilities and other 
details about their personal finances. These disclosures report each member’s year-end holdings 
and a list of transactions executed throughout the year. The financial disclosure reports are as of 
December 31 and are required to be filed by May 15
th
 of the following year. The Center for 
Responsive Politics (https://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/) maintains copies of these forms for all 
members of the U.S. House and Senate, and also provides its own summaries of the data.   
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An example of a financial disclosure report for calendar year 2009 filed by Stephen F. 
Lynch (D-MA), a Democrat House of Representatives member from Massachusetts is provided 
in Appendix A. Page 1 of the disclosure form asks for identifying data for the filer, preliminary 
questions that direct the filer to other schedules of the form, and declarations for whether the filer 
has any blind trusts or other investment vehicles that are not disclosed in the form. Note that 
questions relate not only to Rep. Lynch’s personal wealth, but also those of any spouse or 
dependent child. Since no individual or organization donated to a charity in lieu of paying for a 
speech or appearance by Rep. Lynch (Schedule II), no transactions executed by Rep. Lynch 
during the year exceeded $1,000 (Schedule IV), Rep. Lynch did not receive any gift exceeding 
$335 (Schedule VI), Rep. Lynch did not receive any travel allowance exceeding $335 (Schedule 
VII), and Rep. Lynch did not have any agreement with an outside entity (Schedule IX), certain 
schedules are excluded from the report.  
 In Page 2 of the form, Rep. Lynch indicates that his wife earned income from the South 
Boston Community Health Center, but does not disclose the amount, presumably because it does 
not exceed $1,000. In Pages 3 and 4 of the form, Rep. Lynch lists all of his assets as of Dec. 31, 
2009, all of which are jointly held by his spouse. For this schedule, politicians are required to 
disclose any asset with a value exceeding $1,000 or any asset that resulted in income in excess of 
$200. The form asks for the year-end value of the asset (in broad ranges), the type and amount of 
income the asset produces, and any transactions exceeding $1,000 that were executed during the 
year. In Rep. Lynch’s case, he lists two residences, three publicly-traded firms, and four equity 
funds. Since Cisco Systems, EMC Corporation, and Intel Corporation are all S&P 1500 firms, I 
code each of them as being owned by Rep. Lynch. I repeat this process for all standing members 
of the U.S. House and Senate for each year of my sample period, to obtain the level of politician 
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ownership for all sample firm-year observations. As described above, the relevant schedule for 
this thesis is Schedule III, which lists the assets held by each member of Congress. Page 5 and 6 
of the form indicate that Rep. Lynch has two mortgages with Mt. Washington Bank and is a 
board member for three non-profit organizations. 
 My main measure of politician ownership, POLOWN, is defined as an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are owned by at least one member of the U.S. House or Senate at the 
end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. POFs refer to firms whose shares are owned by at least one 
member of the U.S. House or Senate. Panel B of Table 1 tabulates the industry distribution by 
firm type. Of the 7,980 firm-year observations in the S&P 1500 index, 57% are POFs 
observations. I find a larger percentage of POFs in the Mining, Communications and Utilities 
industries in the sample. These results are not surprising as firms in these industries are likely to 
have greater interactions with legislators and the government.  
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for various firm-year level politician ownership 
variables for sample firms between 2005 and 2011. Measures included are the binary politician 
ownership variable described above, minimum and maximums of a range of the total dollar value 
of equity holdings, and a count measure based on the total number of politician equity investors. 
In Panel A of Table 2, I find that the mean dollar value of equity holdings by all politicians is 
$363,011 (the midpoint of the minimum and maximum), while the mean number of politician 
equity investors is 3.10. These variables exhibit considerable skewness in that the median values 
are only $1,000 (minimum), $4,767 (maximum), and 1 (count), respectively.
20
 
Panel B of Table 2 restricts the observations to those with some level of politician 
ownership. The median firm-year observation for this subsample has 2 politician equity 
                                                          
20
 LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) report that managerial ownership also exhibits considerable skewness, as the 
mean (median) value for their measure of top 5 manager ownership is 4.5% (0.9%). Similarly, managerial 
ownership in their sample firms is of relatively low economic magnitude.    
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investors, with investment values ranging from $16,000 (minimum) to 60,000 (maximum). A 
subset of firms have much higher equity investment by politicians, as the 90
th
 percentile values 
are 13 (count), $577,741 (minimum) and $1,189,724 (maximum), respectively.  
Panels C to E further break down the politician ownership data to those observations only 
owned by distant politicians versus those owned by both distant and local politicians. A local 
politician is defined as one whose congressional district coincides with the firm’s headquarters 
(measured at the state level for members of the Senate and the district level for members of the 
House). As demonstrated in Panel C of Table 2, most of the 4,525 firm-year observations with 
some level of politician ownership do not have any local politician equity investors. For firm-
year observations with only distant politician ownership, the median values of politician 
ownership are 2 (count), $15,000 (minimum), and $50,000 (maximum). These median values are 
lower than those reported in Panel D (4, $98,447, $254,097) for firm-year observations with both 
local and distant politician ownership, suggesting that firms with some level of local politician 
ownership have higher levels of total politician ownership. Finally, Panel E of Table 2 shows 
that ownership by local politicians makes up a non-trivial portion of the total politician 
ownership for firms with local ownership, as the median values of local politician ownership are 
1 (count), $7,844 (minimum), and $31,801 (maximum).    
The relatively low values of politician ownership in my sample is in part a result of my 
focus on S&P 1500 firms, which biases the sample towards larger firms where wealth constraints 
restrict the level of politician ownership. Further, the strength of the economic ties between 
politicians and firms is likely understated in the ownership data as politicians disproportionately 
invest in firms with which they have other links, such as local and contributing firms (Eggers and 
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Hainmueller 2013). The relatively low variation in politician ownership potentially biases against 
finding an association between politician ownership and conservatism. 
4.4. Measures of Conservatism  
 I measure conditional conservatism using Basu’s (1997) earning-return model, which 
regresses earnings on returns and allows the coefficient on returns to vary by sign. This model 
uses positive (negative) stock returns to measure good (bad) economic news. Specifically, Basu 
(1997) estimates the following regression model:  
NIit =0 + 1NEGit + 2RETit + 3RETit*NEGit + t (1) 
 
where: 
NIit = annual income before extraordinary items (IB) of firm i in year t, scaled by the market   
         value of equity (CSHO *PRCC_F) at the end of year t-1; 
 
RETit = buy-and-hold- stock returns of firm i over year t; and 
 
NEGit = indicator variable equal to 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In equation (1), 2 captures the timeliness of earnings with respect to good news (or 
positive returns), and 3 captures the incremental timeliness of earning with respect to bad news 
(or negative returns). The asymmetric timeliness coefficient, 3, measures conservatism. 
To measure unconditional conservatism, I use Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) accrual based 
measure, based on the persistent use of negative accruals. I define CONACC as income before 
extraordinary items less cash flow from operations plus depreciation expense deflated by average 
total assets, and averaged over the previous three years, multiplied by negative one. Larger 
values of CONACC indicate greater unconditional conservatism. The basic intuition of this 
measure is that application of unconditional conservatism results in persistently negative 
accruals. The more negative the accruals over the period, the more unconditionally conservative 
the accounting. For example, if a firm has a policy of taking accelerated depreciation on tangible 
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assets it acquires, then accruals will be persistently negative, resulting in greater unconditional 
conservatism. This measure has both advantages and disadvantages. A key advantage is that by 
averaging over a number of periods, I ensure that the effects of any temporary larger accruals are 
mitigates, as accruals tend to reverse over a two year periods. One disadvantage is that the 
measure does not reflect cumulative unconditional conservatism as it ignores the effects of 
unconditional conservatism in prior periods (i.e. it is not a stock measure).  
My use of these two measures is motivated by their frequent and persistent use by 
researchers over the last two decades. While measurement of conservatism is no doubt a 
controversial topic, these two measures are widely used and commonly accepted.  
4.5. Regression Models for Hypothesis 1 to 3 
 To test the relation between politician ownership and conditional conservatism (H1), I 
follow prior research and estimate the Basu model, which specifies conservatism (the Basu 
coefficient) as a function of politician ownership and other determinants of conservatism:
 
 
 NIit =0 + 1RETit + 2NEGit + 3RETit*NEGit + 4POLOWNit-1 + 5RETit* POLOWNit-1 
                           + 6NEGit*POLOWNit-1 + 7RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1  
                           +8-11CONTROLSit-1 +12-15NEGit*CONTROLSit-1  
                                         +16-19RETit*CONTROLSit-1 +20-23RETit*NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 + it             (2) 
 
where control variables include: 
MVit-1 = Market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F) of firm i at year t-1; 
 
MBit-1 = Market-to-book ratio (MV / CEQ) of firm i at year t-1; 
 
LEVit-1 = Leverage ((DLTT+ DLC) / MV) of firm i at year t-1; and 
 
LITit-1 = Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the following industries at year t-1: 
Biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731- 8734), Computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 
7370-7374), Electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), and Retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961), and 0 
otherwise. 
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In Equation (2), all variables are measured at the firm-year level, and the conservatism 
measure is allowed to vary with politician ownership in each firm-year. The coefficient of 
interest is 7, which captures the effect of politician ownership in firm i at year t-1 (POLOWNit-1) 
on conservatism in firm i's reporting over year t. A negative 7 would be consistent with the 
contracting explanation and suggest that politician ownership reduces lenders concerns about 
downside default risk, leading to a lower demand for conservatism among POFs. Alternatively, a 
positive 7 consistent with the political costs explanation and suggest that ownership subjects 
politicians to voter scrutiny, leading to a greater demand for conservatism among POFs 
I control for firm size (MV), market-to-book (MB), leverage (LEV), and litigation (LIT). 
MV is negatively associated with conservatism (e.g. Givoly et al. 2007; LaFond and Watts 2008), 
possibly because it proxies for lower information asymmetry. MB reflects past asymmetric 
timeliness and growth options, both of which negatively affect future asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). MB can also be thought of as a proxy for 
unconditional conservatism. Beaver and Ryan (2005) and Qiang (2007) find that unconditional 
conservatism lowers book values, thereby reducing subsequent conditional conservatism. This 
implies that there is a negative correlation between the two forms of conservatism and 
controlling for this interrelation can help to properly identify the effect of a given factor on 
conditional conservatism. I include LEV because prior research documents that debt contracting 
creates a demand for conservatism (Watts, 2003). Greater litigation risk creates a noncontracting 
demand for conservatism (e.g., Basu 1997; Watts, 2003) so I include an indicator variable (LIT) 
that captures membership in high-litigation-risk industries (Francis et al. 1994). 
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 To test whether the relation between politician ownership and conditional conservatism 
varies depending on the strength of the firm-politician relationship (H2), I estimate the following 
regression model: 
 
 NIit =0 + 1RETit + 2NEGit + 3RETit*NEGit + 4LPOLOWNit-1 + 5RETit* LPOLOWNit-1   
                    + 6NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 + 7RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 + 8DPOLOWNit-1  
                    + 9RETit* DPOLOWNit-1 + 10NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1   
                               + 11RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 +12-15CONTROLSit-1  
                    +16-19NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 +20-23RETit*CONTROLSit-1  
                    +23-26RETit*NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 + it             (3)   
         
where LPOLOWN and DPOLOWN measure ownership by local and distant politicians, 
respectively. LPOLOWNit-1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are owned by at 
least one member of the U.S. House or Senate who resides over the congressional district 
(measured at the state level for the U.S. Senate and district level for the U.S. House) in which the 
firm is headquartered at the end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. DPOLOWNit-1 is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are owned by at least one member of the U.S. House or 
Senate and none of the members of Congress owning shares in firm i reside over the 
congressional district (measured at the state level for the U.S. Senate and district level for the 
U.S. House) in which the firm is headquartered at the end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. The 
coefficient on RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 and RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 can either be negative 
or positive, depending on the outcome of H1. More importantly, if the contracting (political 
costs) explanation is more relevant in describing the relation between politician ownership and 
conditional conservatism, I should observe 7 < 11 (7 > 11).  
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It is important to note that the construct of interest for H2 is the level of alignment 
between the interests of the politician and the firm. Given the importance of employment 
conditions to politicians’ electoral success, an ideal measure would capture the level of 
employment by each of my sample firms in each politician’s congressional district. However, 
employment data is only available on an aggregated basis, and extant research uses aggregated 
employment data to measure constructs such as labor intensity (Heese, 2014). Given data 
limitations, I use a parsimonious measure of incentive alignment based on the location of sample 
firms’ headquarters. The maintained assumption of this measure is that there is an economic link 
between the district in which a firm is headquartered and the district’s voters and politicians. 
To test whether the relation between politician ownership and conditional conservatism 
varies depending on the extent to which the firm interacts with debt market participants that 
particularly value the contracting benefits of conservatism (H3), I use the existence of an S&P 
long-term issuer credit rating to capture the debt market’s interest in conservatism. Almost all 
firms with an issuer credit rating have public debt outstanding (Cantillo and Wright 2000; Rauh 
and Sufi 2010), and recent research finds that public bondholders have a greater demand for 
conservatism than other lenders because they have limited access to other monitoring 
mechanisms (Nikolaev 2010; Haw et al. 2013). In particular, public bondholders have a greater 
demand for conservatism because, in contrast to private lenders, they lack timely inside 
information, have weaker incentive to monitor managers, and exercise less control over 
managers’ actions (Nikolaev 2010). In addition, credit rating agencies are also an important 
source of demand for conservatism (Bae et al. 2013). Credit rating agencies, such as S&P, are 
primarily interested concerned with assessing downside default risk and therefore demand 
conservative financial reporting as an input to their rating process. However, it is important to 
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interpret the results using this measure with a caveat, as it is an indirect measure of the construct 
of interest.  Ideally, one would like to measure the various aspects that make up sample firms 
debt structure, including public debt, private debt, and other forms of debt. Data at such a 
disaggregated level is not available for a large sample of firms. I assume that if a firm has an 
issuer credit rating, it is followed actively by credit rating agencies and public bondholders, two 
debt market participants that have been shown to value the contracting benefits of conservatism. 
Nonetheless, the empirical measure captures the construct of interest with noise, a point one 
needs to keep in mind when interpreting the results of H3. 
To test H3, I reestimate equations (2) and (3), and interact the main variables of interest 
(RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 in equation (2) and RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 and 
RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 in equation (3)) with RATINGit-1, an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
firm i has an S&P long-term issuer credit rating at the end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. I interact 
only RATINGit-1 with the main variables of interest to maintain a parsimonious model.   
4.6. Regression Models for Hypothesis 4 
To test the relation between politician ownership and unconditional conservatism, I 
follow prior research and estimate the following model: 
CONACCit =0 + 1POLOWNit-1 + 2MVit-1 + + 3MBit-1 + 4LEVit-1  
                           + 5LITit-1 + 6CFOit-1+ it             (4) 
 
In Equation (4), all variables are measured at the firm-year level, including the firm-
specific measure of unconditional conservatism, CONACC. The coefficient of interest is 1, 
which captures the effect of politician ownership in firm i at year t-1 (POLOWNit-1) on 
unconditional conservatism in firm i's reporting over year t. A positive 1 would be consistent 
with the political costs explanation and suggest that politician ownership induces a greater level 
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of unconditional conservatism. Alternatively, a negative or insignificant 1 would provide 
evidence against the validity of the political costs explanation in this setting.   
As for control variables, I control for firm size (MV), market-to-book (MB), leverage 
(LEV), and litigation (LIT). The intuition for these control variables is similar to the discussion 
for model (2), and these are included because Ahmed and Duellman (2013) provide evidence 
that these variables are consistently significant determinants of firm-specific measures of 
conservatism. Given that MB is an alternative measure of unconditional conservatism, it is 
unclear whether it should be included in equation (4). In untabulated tests, I find that excluding 
MB does not alter any of the inferences, and thus I retain it to maintain consistency with prior 
studies. I also include cash flow from operations (CFO) in model (4) as Ahmed and Duellman 
(2013) demonstrate that this measure is a strong predictor of firm-specific measures of 
conservatism.  CFO is measured as cash flow from operations divided by market value.  
4.7. Conclusions 
 This chapter reviews my sample selection and data collection methods, the construction 
of my politician ownership and accounting conservatism measures, and the design of my 
empirical models. Given that a major contribution of the thesis is the introduction of the 
politician ownership data to an accounting context, this section devotes considerable attention to 
describing the underlying data. Equations (2) to (4) in this chapter form the base of my tests for 
Hypothesis 1 through 4 and the results will be reported in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPERICAL ANALYSIS – POLITICIAN OWNERSHIP AND 
ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM 
5.1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, I test my four hypotheses and thus investigate the empirical relation 
between accounting conservatism and politician ownership. I empirically examine Equations (2), 
(3), and (4) from Sections 4.5 and 4.6 using firm-level samples of data, over the time period 
2005-2011. This chapter includes six sections, including this introduction and conclusion.  
 Section 5.2 of this chapter examines the descriptive statistics relevant to my primary 
hypothesis tests. This examination also includes a review of a correlation table for my primary 
variables of interest and control variables. Section 5.3 of this chapter provides the main table of 
analysis for Hypothesis 1. Table 4 of this section reports the results of Hypothesis 1.  
 Section 5.4 and 5.5 reports the results of the remaining three hypotheses. Section 5.4 
describes the results for the additional cross-sectional tests based on Hypothesis 2 and 3, while 
Section 5.5 describes the results for Hypothesis 4, where the dependent variable is a firm-year 
measure of unconditional conservatism. Section 5.6 concludes this chapter. 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Panel A of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and control 
variables, separately for POFs and non-POFs. Over the sample period, POFs are profitable 
(median NI = 0.056), with strong stock market performance (median RET = 0.063). POFs are 
also relatively large firms (median MV = 4,253 million), with high growth options (median MB = 
2.5), and some debt (median LEV = 0.18). 32% of POFs are in highly litigious industries. 
Consistent with prior studies on politically connected firms (Cooper et al. 2010), I find that POFs 
exhibit better operating performance but lower stock return performance, have higher growth 
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options, are more leveraged, and are larger than non-POFs. The most pronounced differences 
between POFs and non-POFs, in terms of economic magnitude, are with respect to firm size and 
future growth opportunities. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients for the complete set of variables. 
Typically all correlations of more than 3% in absolute value are statistically significant at a 5% 
level or better. Consistent with Panel A, the politician ownership indicator variable is positively 
correlated with NI, MV, and MB, and negatively correlated with RET. For the entire sample of 
firms, operating performance is positively correlated with stock market performance (correlation 
coefficient of 0.202) and size (correlation coefficient of 0.058) and negatively correlated with 
leverage (correlation coefficient of 0.270). In addition to having worst operating performance, 
more levered firms have better stock market performance (correlation coefficient of 0.164), a 
lower incidence of negative stock market performance (correlation coefficient of 0.038), and are 
smaller firms (correlation coefficient of 0.039), with lower growth options (correlation 
coefficient of 0.039). Most of the correlations among control variables are small, and thus, 
multicollinearity is not an issue. 
5.3. Hypothesis Test – H1 
 To test Hypothesis 1, I estimate equation (2) using pooled OLS regressions. I correct 
standard errors for correlation across observations of a given firm and across observations of a 
given year by clustering on both firm and year (Petersen 2009).
 
To mitigate the influence of 
outliers, I use Cook’s (1977) distance (Cook’s D) method to remove outliers. I use a Cook’s 
distance of 4/(n-k-1) as the cut-off for identifying an observation as an outlier, where n = number 
of observations and k = number of independent variables, as suggested by Belsley et al. (2005). 
Table 4 reports the estimation results. Column (1) uses the binary politician ownership variable. 
The coefficient 3 has a positive and statistically significant value of 0.25, in line with findings in 
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Basu (1997). This coefficient decreases in the POLOWN variable, as suggested by the coefficient 
7, and is significantly negative at the 1% level. This result indicates that politician ownership is 
associated with lower levels of financial reporting conservatism, as predicted by the contracting 
explanation. Column (2) augments the base model by adding size, market-to-book ratio, 
leverage, and litigation risk along with their respective interactions with RET, NEG, and 
RET*NEG. Consistent with prior research, I finds that conditional conservatism increases with 
leverage and litigation risk, and decreases with size and the market-to-book ratio. Although 
including these other common determinants of conservatism in the regression increases 
explanatory power (the adjusted R
2 
increases by 6%), the main results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. Columns (3) and (4) employ a count measure of politician ownership, based on the 
number of politicians investing in a particular firm. The results based on the count measure of 
politician ownership yield similar inferences, although firm size is no longer significant in 
predicting the level of conditional conservatism among sample firms. With the exception of size, 
the coefficient estimates and statistical significance levels of variables are very similar across the 
two measures of politician ownership, providing greater confidence in the documented results. 
 To gauge the economic significance of my findings on politician ownership, I follow the 
approach used in Nikolaev (2010) and compare coefficient estimates of 7 to those of 3. In 
column (2), the magnitude of 7 is -0.072, which suggests that politician ownership is associated 
with an economically important 0.07 (or 64% of 3) decrease in accounting conservatism. The 
magnitude of 7 is -0.011 in column (4), which suggests that adding 8 politician investors (i.e, 
close to one standard deviation) yields a 0.09 (or 88% of 3) decrease in conservatism.  
 To summarize, using Basu’s (1997) earning-return model of conservatism, I find strong 
evidence that POFs adopt less conservative accounting than non-POFs. These results are 
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consistent with the contracting explanation of conservatism, namely that lenders demand less 
conditional conservatism from POFs because they are less concerned about downside default 
risk, and inconsistent with the positive association predicted by the political costs explanation.  
5.4. Hypotheses Tests – H2 and H3 
 In this subsection, I examine whether the impact of politician ownership on conditional 
conservatism varies with the strength of the politician-firm connection as well as the extent to 
which the firm interacts with debt market participants that value the contracting benefits of 
conservatism. As Hypothesis 1 produced a negative relation, I expect both of these factors to 
moderate the relationship between politician ownership, such that the relationship is significantly 
more negative for local POFs (H2) and firms with long-term S&P credit issuer ratings (H3). 
Evidence consist with these hypotheses would provide support for the contracting explanation.  
 Table 5 reports the results of Hypothesis 2. As in Table 4, the coefficient 3 has a positive 
and statistically significant value in both columns, in line with findings in Basu (1997). In 
column (1), I find that both 7 and 11 are significantly negative, consistent with the results in 
Table 4 that POFs adopt less conditionally conservative accounting than non-POFs (p-values = 
0.00 and 0.00, respectively). Furthermore, 7 is significantly less than 11 (p-value = 0.00), 
implying that lenders have weaker demand for conservatism from local POFs than distant POFs. 
The second column indicates that these results are robust to including the control variables, MV, 
MB, LEV, and LIT. Once again, including the control variables increases explanatory power (the 
adjusted R
2 
increases by 8%), but do not alter the inferences from the first column. Interestingly, 
the coefficient on 7 is -0.132 (or 100% of 3), which suggests that local politician ownership 
completely mitigates the demand for conservative financial reporting. In contrast, the coefficient 
on 11 is -0.076 (or 58% of 3), indicating that distant politician ownership weakens, but does 
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not eliminate, the demand for conservatism. From this hypothesis test, I conclude that there is 
cross-sectional variation in the demand for conditional conservatism based on the strength of the 
economic connection between the politician investor and the POF, as measured by local ties. 
This result provides support for the contracting explanation and provides further evidence against 
the validity of the political costs explanation in this setting.  
Table 6 presents the results of Hypothesis 3. In column (1), I find that the coefficients on 
RETit*NEGit and RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 are significantly positive and negative (at the 1% 
level), consistent with expectations. The coefficient on RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1* RATINGit-1 
(p-value = 0.04) is negative and statistically significant. This finding suggests that the negative 
association between politician ownership and conditional conservatism is strengthened by the 
extent to which the firm interacts with debt market participants (i.e. credit rating agencies, public 
bondholders) that value the contracting benefits of conditional conservatism.  
As in Table 5, column (2) further partitions the politician ownership variable into a local 
and distant component. Column (2) yields similar inferences to column (1), as the coefficients on 
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1, RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1, RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1*RATINGit-
1 and RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1*RATINGit-1 are all negative and statistically signcificant (p-
values = 0.00, 0.00, 0.06, and 0.01, respectively).  
Overall, this analysis provide confirmatory evidence that the negative association 
between politician ownership and conservatism can be attributed to debt market participants 
being less concerned about downside default risk for POFs than non-POFs. This evidence is 
consistent with H3 and provides support for the contracting explanation in this setting. 
5.5. Hypothesis Test – H4 
 Table 7 presents the estimation of equation (4) using the accrual-based measures of 
unconditional conservatism as the dependent variable. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 4, I find an 
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insignificant coefficient on the binary (p-value = 0.13), count (p-value = 0.17), and distant (p-
value = 0.16) measures of politician ownership and a significantly negative coefficient on the 
local ownership variable (p-value = 0.01). The results are inconsistent with political costs 
generating a demand for unconditional conservatism. The coefficients on LIT and CFO are 
positive and significant across all three columns (p-value = 0.00), indicating that firms facing 
greater litigation risk and more profitable firms use less unconditionally conservative accounting. 
As expected, I find a negative and significant coefficient on MV in two of the three columns (p-
value = 0.00), suggesting that larger firms use more unconditionally conservative accounting. 
Unexpectedly, the coefficient on MB is significantly positive in all three columns, at the 10% 
level, while the coefficient on LEV is significantly negative in all three columns, at the 5% level. 
One possible explanation for the result on MB is that both MB and CONACC are capturing 
unconditional conservatism, and are thus positively correlated. One possible explanation for the 
result on LEV is that debtholder presence induces a demand for conditional conservatism, 
reducing opportunities for unconditional conservatism. Overall, the results reported in Table 7 
provide further evidence against the validity of the political costs explanation in this setting.  
5.6. Conclusions 
 In summary, evidence presented in this chapter is generally consistent with the view that 
politician ownership influences the level of accounting conservatism, particularly conditional 
conservatism. My main analysis shows a negative and statistically significant relation between 
measures of politician ownership and conditional conservatism. This relationship is more 
pronounced when the ownership includes politicians local to the firm and when the firm interacts 
with debt market participants (i.e. credit rating agencies, public bondholders) that particularly 
value the contracting benefits of conservative financial reporting. None of these results are 
consistent with the validity of the political costs explanation in this setting. Further analysis 
47 
 
suggests that politician ownership is not associated with unconditional conservatism, providing 
further evidence against (in support of) the political costs (contracting) explanation. The 
sensitivity and robustness of these conclusions will be tested in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
6.1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, I conduct supplemental tests to assess the sensitivity of the preceding 
analyses and the robustness of the findings. The additional empirical analysis includes control 
variables relating to ownership structure, alternative measures of conditional conservatism, 
attempts to establish the direction of association between politician ownership and accounting 
conservatism, and alternative estimation approaches. This chapter includes six sections, 
including this introduction and a conclusion. 
 Section 6.2 of this chapter examines whether the findings of the previous chapter are 
robust to controlling for other attributes of the ownership structure. Section 6.3 employs 
alternative measures of conditional conservatism, while Section 6.4 devotes effort to assessing 
reverse causality and simultaneity concerns.  Section 6.5 uses a number of different estimations 
in an effort to support and extend the results documented in the previous chapter, including 
clustering standard errors at the firm level and employing year and firm fixed effects. Section 6.6 
concludes the chapter.  
6.2. Controlling for Ownership Structure 
 While I motivate my analysis from the perspective of debt market participants, recent 
research finds that equity investors also demand conditional conservatism (e.g., Ahmed and 
Duellman 2007; LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; LaFond and Watts 2008; Ramalingegowda 
and Yu 2012; Kim et al. 2013). These studies typically reflect themes of corporate governance, 
and in this section, I control for the influence on equity holders’ demand for conservatism when 
testing H1 to H3. I do not rexamine H4, controlling for ownership structure, because LaFond and 
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Roychowdhury (2008) argue that the relation between managerial ownership and unconditional 
conservatism is ambiguous, and Ahmed and Duellman (2013) provide evidence that managerial 
ownership is a weak predictor of unconditional conservatism. I measure equity holders’ demand 
for conservatism as the percentage of the firms’ equity owned by the CEO (CEOOWN). LaFond 
and Roychowdhury (2008) argue that as managerial ownership decreases, the severity of agency 
problems between managers and shareholders increases, generating a demand for conservatism. 
Both LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Ahmed and Duellman (2013) focus on CEO 
ownership, arguing that the CEO is the key agent of the shareholder in charge of the firms’ 
operations and policies. LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) also demonstrate a very high 
correlation between ownership by the CEO and ownership by the top five managers of a firm 
(pearson correlation coefficient of 0.87), and demonstrate that the results are insensitive to 
whether managerial ownership is measured for the top five managers or the CEO alone. Thus, I 
use the more parsimonious measure of ownership, focusing on ownership of the CEO. 
 Table 8 presents the results of testing Hypothesis 1 through 3, controlling for the effects 
of ownership structure in Equations (2) and (3). Consistent with earlier results, the coefficient on 
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 in column 1 is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that politician 
ownership is negatively associated with conditional conservatism (H1), even after controlling for 
managerial ownership. The coefficient on RETit*NEGit*CEOOWNit-1 is also significantly 
negative, at the 1% level, suggesting that managerial ownership is also a significant determinant 
of conditional conservatism. In column 2 of Table 8, the coefficients on 
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 and RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 continue to be significantly 
negative after controlling for managerial ownership, with the coefficient on local ownership 
being significantly more negative than that on distant ownership (p-value = 0.00), consistent with 
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H2. Finally, in column 3 of Table 8, the coefficient on RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1*RATINGit-1 
remains significantly negative (p-value = 0.08) after controlling for managerial ownership, 
consistent with H3. As in column 1, the coefficient on RETit*NEGit*CEOOWNit-1 is significantly 
negative, at the 1% level, in both columns 2 and 3. 
 In sum, managerial ownership is negatively associated with conditional conservatism in 
my analysis. However, the presence of managerial ownership in my empirical model does not 
diminish the influence of politician ownership on conditional conservatism, not does its 
exclusion significantly affect the estimated coefficients of the politician ownership variables. 
Overall, both managerial and politician ownership appear to be important factors in my model of 
conditional conservatism.  
6.3. Alternative Measures of Conditional Conservatism 
 In Chapter 4, I discuss why the Basu (1997) earnings-return model is the appropriate 
measure of conditional conservatism for my setting. Nevertheless, there is disagreement in the 
literature regarding empirical measures of conditional conservatism, and so use alternative 
proxies for conditional conservatism. In this section, my objective is to establish that politician 
ownership influences conditional conservatism, and that this relationship is not an artifact of the 
specific measure used, and therefore focus on H1. As I have already demonstrated that politician 
ownership negatively influences conditional conservatism (measured using the earnings-return 
model) in Table 4, I make directional predictions for this analysis, and use one-tailed tests.  
First, I assess the robustness of the results to another commonly used measure of 
conditional conservatism that does not rely on stock returns: the earnings-change model (Basu 
1997). Recently, the measure has been used by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and 
Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012), among others, as a proxy for conditional conservatism.  
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It measures timely gain and loss recognition as the tendency for increases and decreases 
in earnings to reverse. Greater conservatism leads to lower persistence of earnings changes, 
implying that bad (good) news incorporated in current earnings will appear as a transitory 
(permanent) shock in the earnings process. Similar to Equation (2), I extend the basic earnings-
change model as follows: 
 NIit+1 =0 +  + 2NEGit + 3*NEGit + 4POLOWNit-1 + 5*POLOWNit-1  
                         + 6NEGit*POLOWNit-1 + 7*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 +8-11CONTROLSit-1   
                         +12-15NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 +16-19*CONTROLSit-1 
                         + 20-23it*NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 + it              (5) 
 
where (the control variables are the same as in Equation (2)): 
= Change in annual net income before extraordinary items (IB) of firm i from year t-1 to t, 
scaled by total assets (AT) at the end of year t-1; and 
 
NEGit  = Indicator variable equal to 1 if is negative, and 0 otherwise.  
 
   
 In Equation (5), 7 captures the association between politician ownership and 
conservatism. If greater conditional conservatism leads to lower persistence of earnings changes, 
7 > 0 would indicate that conditional conservatism decreases with politician ownership.  
Table 9 reports the results for estimating Equation (5). Column 1 reports the results for 
the binary ownership variable, while Column 2 reports the results for the count ownership 
variable. I find that POFs recognize bad news in a less timely manner than non-POFs. The 
relationship approaches statistical significance for the binary variable (p-values = 0.13) and is 
significant for the count variable (p-values = 0.08). Overall, the results from the earnings-change 
model are consistent with those from the earnings-return model, indicating that the inferences 
from my main tests are robust to this alternative measure of conditional conservatism.   
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 Second, following Ball and Shivakumar (2005), I estimate conditional conservatism 
using the following piecewise linear relation between accruals and cash flows: 
ACCit =0 + 1CFOit + 2DCFOit + 3CFOit*DCFOit + 4POLOWNit-1  
 + 5CFOit* POLOWNit- + 6DCFOit*POLOWNit-1 + 7CFOit*DCFOit*POLOWNit-1  
                           +8-11CONTROLSit-1 +12-15CFOit*CONTROLSit-1  
                                         +16-19DCFOit*CONTROLSit-1 +20-23CFOit*DCFOit*CONTROLSit-1 + it            (6) 
 
where (the control variables are the same as in Equation (2)): 
ACCit = is accruals scaled by beginning total assets (AT). Accruals are defined as earnings before 
exceptional items and extraordinary item (IB) is minus cash flows from operations (OCANF). 
 
CFOit = is cash flows from operations (OCANF) scaled by beginning total assets (AT). 
 
DCFOit = is an indicator variable equal to one if CFO is negative, and zero otherwise. 
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that the above piecewise linear regression captures 
two roles of accruals: mitigation of noise in cash flows and asymmetric recognition of unrealized 
gains and losses. 1 measures the extent to which accruals mitigate noise in cash flows and is 
predicted to be negative. Asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition results in asymmetry 
in the relation between accruals and cash flows (similar to the asymmetry between returns and 
net income in the Basu (1997) earnings return model). Unrealized losses, as accrual charges 
against earnings, are likely to be recognized more quickly than unrealized gains. This asymmetry 
in timeliness of recognition implies that the negative relation between cash flows and accruals is 
less pronounced in periods with unrealized losses than in periods with unrealized gains. 
Therefore, the asymmetric timeliness coefficient, 3, captures conditional conservatism and is 
expected to be positive. 7 captures the association between politician ownership and conditional 
conservatism.7 < 0 would indicate that conservatism decreases with politician ownership.  
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Table 10 reports the results for estimating Equation (6). Column 1 reports the results for 
the binary ownership variable, while Column 2 reports the results for the count ownership 
variable. As expected, the coefficient on 1 is significantly negative in both columns. However, 
the asymmetric timeliness coefficient, 3, is not significantly positive in either column. The 
coefficient of interest, 7 is also not significantly different from zero, suggesting that politician 
ownership is not associated with conditional conservatism. In untabulated results, I find that MB 
and LEV are also not significant determinants of conditional conservatism in this model.  
These results are inconsistent with those using the earning-return and earnings-change 
models. It is particularly troubling that the coefficient on 3 and the control variables are not 
significant in the direct predicted. I investigate the percentage of firm-year observations with 
negative cashflows (DCFO = 1) during the sample period, and find that the percentage is very 
low (5%) relative to the percentage of firm-year observations with negative returns (41%) in the 
earning-return model and negative changes in earnings (35%) in the earnings-change model. 
Given the distribution of cash flows for my sample, it is possible that the Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) piecewise linear regression model lacks adequate power to identify significant 
determinants of conditional conservatism.  Thus, I am unable to conclude whether my results are 
robust to using the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) measure of conditional conservatism.  
6.4. Establishing the Direction of Association  
A negative relation between politician ownership and conditional conservatism is 
consistent with lenders demanding less conservatism from POFs as a result of being less 
concerned about downside default risk. However, it may be the case that firms with less 
conservative financial reporting attract investment by politicians. This “reverse causality” 
explanation is plausible as firms with lowers levels of (ex-ante) financial reporting quality may 
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be more likely to establish political connections (Chaney et al. 2011). In addition, conditional 
conservatism and ownership by politicians could arise simultaneously, driven by some unknown 
underlying factor (the "simultaneity" explanation). In this subsection, I perform two tests to 
provide evidence on the direction of association between politicians’ equity holdings and 
conditionally conservative reporting. In this section, my objective is to establish the direction of 
association, and therefore focus on H1. As I have not previously demonstrated this relationship, I 
make non-directional predictions, and therefore use two-tailed tests.   
Following Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012), I add politicians’ current and lead ownership 
(i.e., POLOWNit and POLOWNit+1) to Equation (2) to examine how the level of conditional 
conservatism is related to lagged, current, and lead ownership by politicians: 
NIit =0 + 1RETit + 2NEGit + 3RETit*NEGit + 4POLOWNit-1 + 5RETit* POLOWNit-1  
                         + 6NEGit*POLOWNit-1 + 7RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 + 8POLOWNit  
                         + 9RETit* POLOWNit + 10NEGit*POLOWNit 
                         +11RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit   + 12POLOWNit+1 + 13RETit* POLOWNit+1   
                         + 14NEGit*POLOWNit+1 + 15RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit+1    
                                     +16-19CONTROLSit-1 + 20-23NEGit*CONTROLSit-1  
                                     +24-27RETit*CONTROLSit-1 +28-31RETit*NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 + it        (7) 
 
In Equation (7), 7, 11, and15 capture the relation between conservatism and 
politicians’ lagged, current, and lead ownership, respectively. If lenders demand less 
conservatism from POFs, I would expect 7>0. In contrast, the reverse causality explanation 
would predict 15>0. Evidence of 11>0 would be consistent with the simultaneity explanation. 
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Table 11 reports the results from estimating equation (7). Consistent with lenders 
demanding less conservative reporting from POFs, I find a significant negative relation between 
conditional conservatism and lagged politician ownership (p-values = 0.01 and 0.00 in columns 
(1) and (2), respectively). In contrast, the relation between conditional conservatism and current 
(p-values = 0.16 and 0.22, respectively) and lead politician ownership (p-values = 0.70 and 0.97, 
respectively) is insignificant, providing no support for the reverse causality or simultaneity 
explanations.  
In the second test, I follow LaFond and Watts (2008) and Ramalingegowda and Yu 
(2012) and examine the relation between changes in politician ownership and lagged, concurrent, 
and lead changes in conditional conservatism. I sort each firm-year observations into one of three 
groups based on the change in politician ownership from t-1 to t (i.e., POLOWNit - POLOWNit-
1). The first group includes firm-years with a decrease in the number of politician investors (n = 
1,152 observations) relative to the prior year, the second group includes firm-years with no 
change in the number of politician investors relative to the prior year (n = 2,169), and the third 
group includes firm-years with an increase in the number of politician investors relative to the 
prior year (n=969). Then, for each group, I estimate the level of conditional conservatism (i.e., 
3 in Equation (1)) for each of the years t-2 to t+1. This approach allows me to estimate the 
year-to-year change in conditional conservatism prior to the ownership change (3t-1 - 3t-2), 
concurrent with the ownership change (3t - 3t-1), and after the ownership change (3t+1 - 
3t). Since I require two years of lagged data and one year of lead data, I restrict this analysis to 
sample years 2007 to 2010. If politician ownership impacts the demand for conditional 
conservatism, I would expect a positive (negative) association between decreases (increases) in 
politician ownership and lead changes in conditional conservatism. In contrast, the reverse 
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causality (simultaneity) explanation would make similar directional predictions between changes 
in politician ownership and lagged (concurrent) changes in conditional conservatism. The Basu 
coefficients are estimated based on separate regressions, for each group (3 in total) and time 
period (4 in total), and differences in means are compared using t-tests.   
Panel A of Table 12 presents the average change in politician ownership for each of the 
groups as well as the Basu coefficients (the coefficient from Equation (1)) for each of the groups 
and reporting periods. For the firms in the ownership decrease (increase) group, the average 
change in politician ownership is 2.05 (1.78) politician investors. In general, conservatism is 
increasing over time as indicated by the general increase in the Basu coefficient from t-2 to t+1. 
Panel B reports the change in the conditional conservatism measure (i.e., the Basu 
coefficient) prior to the ownership change (3,t-1 - 3,t-2), concurrent with the ownership 
change (3,t - 3,t-1), and after the ownership change (3,t+1 - 3,t), respectively. For the 
ownership decrease group, there is no statistically significant change in conservatism prior to or 
concurrent with the period of change of politician ownership, but an increase in the level of 
conservatism after the change in ownership. This evidence is consistent with politician 
ownership influencing the level of conditional conservatism and inconsistent with the reverse 
causality or simultaneity explanations. For the ownership increase group, there is no significant 
increase in any of the three periods. These results provide no definitive evidence consistent with 
any of three explanations. Finally, in Panel C, I compare across group differences between the 
ownership increase and decrease groups in the three periods. There is no statistically significant 
difference in the change in conservatism across the groups in any of three periods.  
Overall, this test provides limited evidence consistent with politician ownership 
influencing the level of conditional conservatism in future years. Importantly, this test provides 
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no evidence consistent with either the simultaneity or reverse causality explanations. A possible 
explanation for the lack of consistent results, particularly for the ownership increase group, 
includes a lack of power stemming from a reduced sample period which is concentrated heavily 
in financial crisis years (relative to the main sample). Of course, another interpretation of the 
results is that it casts doubt on my main results, and the direction of association predicted. While 
I cannot definitively rule out alternative explanations, I interpret the collective evidence from 
Table 11 and Table 12 as suggesting that the direction of the relation goes from politician 
ownership to conservatism, rather than the reverse or arising simultaneously.   
6.5. Alternative Estimations 
 In this subsection, I report the results of several different estimations to provide evidence 
on the sensitivity of the hypothesis tests.  
 First, I assess the sensitivity of clustering standard errors on firm alone rather than on 
both firm and time. Petersen (2009) demonstrates that clustering on both firm and time is not 
superior to clustering on firm alone when there is little within-time correlation in the errors. As 
the underlying concern relates to estimation and is not specific to a particular for of conservatism 
or hypothesis, I retest all four hypotheses here. Table 13 provides the results, with Panel A 
reporting the results for conditional conservatism (H1 to H3) and Panel B reporting the results 
for unconditional conservatism (H4). As I use annual measures of returns rather than multi-year 
accumulations as the dependent variable for H1 to H3, firm-level clustering may be more 
appropriate in my setting.  The results in Panel A are quite consistent with those reported earlier 
in that all three hypothesis are supported, at similar level of statistical significance. In contrast to 
the results reported in Table 7, results in Panel B of Table 13 demonstrate that politician 
ownership is negatively associated with unconditional conservatism, at the 10% level of 
significance or better, in all three specifications. Given that the dependent variable, CONACC, is 
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measured based on firm’s accrual averaged over the previous three years, clustering on both firm 
and time for the analysis on unconditional conservatism is arguably superior to clustering on firm 
alone. Furthermore, the test reveals a negative relationship between politician ownership and 
unconditional conservatism, and thus earlier inferences regarding the lack of support for H4 
continue to hold. 
 Second, I assess the robustness of the results to inclusion of firm and year fixed effects.  
Several researchers discuss and provide empirical evidence of bias in Basu (1997) based 
estimates of conditional conservatism (e.g., Dietrich et al., 2007; Givoly et al., 2007; Patatoukas 
and Thomas, 2011). However, Ball et al., (2012) show that inclusion of firm and year fixed 
effects eliminates the bias as it helps to control for information that is incorporated in lagged 
earnings. Given the relatively low variation in politician ownership over time, inclusion of firm 
fixed effects may not be the most appropriate estimation for my setting. Thus, my approach is to 
estimate my models with and without fixed effects, triangulating evidence from both estimations. 
As the underlying concern relates to estimation and is specific to the conditional form of 
conservatism, I retest H1-H3. Table 14 reports the results of H1-H3, with the firm and year fixed 
effects included in Equations (2) and (3). As expected, the r-squared values increase 
considerably with the inclusion of firm and year fixed effects, ranging between 64% and 68% in 
Table 14. In the first two columns of Table 14, I continue to find support for H1 and H2, as 
politician ownership is negatively associated with conditional conservatism (p-value = 0.04), and 
this relationship is more pronounced when the ownership is local (p-value = 0.00). While I 
continue to find directional support consistent with H3, the coefficient on 
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1* RATINGit-1 is not significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.19). 
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Overall, including firm and year fixed effect in my models of conditional conservatism does not 
appear to drastically alter inferences. 
 Finally, I examine the level of collinearity among the many interaction variables in 
Tables 4-6 to assess whether estimation techniques (such a centering approach) are needed to 
reduce the extent of collinearity in the interaction terms. I compute condition indexes to formally 
assess collinearity. Weak dependencies are associated with condition indexes of 5–10; moderate 
to strong dependencies have condition indexes of 30–100 (Belsey et al. 1980). The highest 
condition number for the models reported in Table  4-6 is 24, suggesting that collinearity is not a 
significant problem in reported results and that a centering approach is not needed. 
6.6. Conclusions 
 In summary, evidence presented in this chapter helps to demonstrate that the inferences 
from Chapter 5 are robust to controlling for equity ownership, using an alternative measure of 
conditional conservatism, and different estimation techniques. The evidence from this chapter 
that aims to establish the direction of association is mixed, with one test providing strong support 
for politician ownership influencing the level of conservatism, while another test provides little 
support for this particular direction of association. Thus, the evidence from this chapter provides 
only partial evidence to rule out reverse causality and simultaneity based explanations. Final 
remarks on the implications of these findings follow in Chapter 7.  
 Of course, as in any study, a number of lingering questions remain. First, this thesis 
argues that lenders assess a lower downside default risk for politician owned firms, and therefore 
demand less conditional conservatism from these firms. In future research, it would be useful to 
establish an explicit link between politician ownership and lenders’ assessment of default risk. It 
would also be useful to more carefully establish the chain of events, by identifying when 
politician investment is made in a particular firm, how this influences contracting terms once a 
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debt agreement is initiated, and how this subsequently alters the conservatism of the firm’s 
reporting. Furthermore, the construct of interest in this study is political connections, and it 
would therefore be fruitful to examine whether the documented results are consistent for 
different measures of politician connections. At this stage, I leave these, and other important 
research questions, for future research. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 This thesis investigates the association between U.S. politicians’ equity holdings and 
accounting conservatism for a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2005 to 2011. My objective is to 
distinguish between two competing hypotheses: (1) the contracting hypothesis, which predict 
that POFs will adopt less conservative reporting because lenders are not as concerned with 
downside default risk; and (2) the political costs hypothesis, which predicts that POFs will adopt 
more conservative reporting because politicians value conservatism’s ability to reduce the 
political costs imposed on them by voters.  
My analysis demonstrates that POFs, on average, adopt less conditionally conservative 
accounting than non-POFs. I also find that this negative association is more pronounced when 
politicians invest in firms headquartered in their congressional district. This suggests that lenders 
demand less conservative accounting from POFs, especially when the interests of the politician 
and the firm are more strongly aligned. Further, the relation between politician ownership and 
conditional conservatism is more pronounced for firms with long-term issuer credit ratings, 
indicating POFs adopt less conservative reporting because of a reduced demand from debt 
market participants. In tests relating politician ownership to unconditional conservatism, I do not 
find evidence that POFs adopt more unconditionally conservative accounting practices. This 
provides further evidence against the validity of the political costs hypothesis in this setting. 
Taken together, the collective evidence is consistent with lender incorporating the implicit 
advantages of political connections into their assessment of downside default risk.  
This thesis joins a growing empirical literature examining the implications of ownership 
structure for accounting conservatism (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Bushman and Piotroski, 
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2006; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Nichols et al., 2009; Chen 
et al. 2010; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). I build on these prior studies by documenting that 
political connections arising from politician participation in equity markets impact financial 
reporting conservatism. This paper also provides evidence to support the theory that lenders rely 
on an implicit guarantee from politicians that politically connected firms will have access to 
government funds in case of financial distress. Finally, this study extends research on the 
economic consequences of politician ownership by suggesting that these investments can 
substitute for other mechanisms, such as accounting conservatism, that create benefits for firms 
in their interactions with capital market participants.  
Two main caveats are in order. First, I caution against drawing any causal relation 
between politician ownership and conservatism based on the results of this study. Although I 
have performed lead-lag tests to establish the direction of association and controlled for various 
firm characteristics that are expected to impact the demand for conservatism, other unobservable 
systematic differences could potentially explain the observed difference in accounting 
conservatism between POFs and non-POFs. Second, assessing whether the link between 
politicians and firms arising from politician ownership is sufficiently strong to impose political 
costs on politicians is difficult to establish. Furthermore, for my sample firms and over my 
sample period, there is variation in important institutional features such as the proximity to the 
election cycle, term limits, and the ability of the politician to influence firms’ reporting choices, 
which may add noise to the analysis. Therefore, the extent to which politician ownership 
correlates with conditional and unconditional conservatism may not represent the most powerful 
test of the political costs explanation of conservatism. These caveats notwithstanding, the results 
should be of relevance to a broad set of stakeholders, including legislators, capital market 
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participants, regulators, standard-setters and  researchers from various disciplines (accounting, 
finance, political economics and political science), with an interest in analyzing the interactions 
of politicians and firms.    
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TABLE 1 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION 
 
Panel A: Sample selection  
Selection process                                                                                                                                                                    # of observations 
Firm-years available in S&P 1500 Index (as per Execucomp) from 2005 to 2011  10,555 
Less: 
     Firm-years in Compustat with missing data to compute net income, leverage, and market-to-book ratio 763  
     Firm-years in CRSP with missing data on returns 203  
     Firm-years in the financial industry (SIC 6000-6999) 1,609  
Final sample over 2005-2011 (1,540 firms)  7,980 
Panel B: Industry composition of sample firm-years, by firm type.  
Industry Group Politician Owned Firms(POFs)   Non-Politician Owned Firms  % of POFs 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 11  7  61 
Mining 277  108  72 
Construction 78  68  53 
Manufacturing 2,193  1,799  55 
Transportation 144  102  59 
Communications 129  48  73 
Utilities 388  176  69 
Wholesale trade 148  163  48 
Retail trade 449  377  54 
Services  697  602  54 
Public administration 11  5  69 
          
Total        4,525            3,455  57 
 
This table reports the composition of the sample, which consists of 7,980 firm-years from 1,540 firms in the S&P 1500 index (S&P 500, S&P Mid 
Cap 400, and S&P Small Cap 600 indexes) covering the period 2005–2011. Panel A explains the sample selection process. Panel B reports the 
industry distribution of sample-firm years by firm type. Industry groups are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Politician owned 
firms (POFs) refer to firms for which at least one member of the U.S. House and Senate owns shares of the company. 
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TABLE 2 
COMMON STOCK HOLDINGS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS: 2005-2011 
 
Panel A: Firm-year measures of politician ownership (n=7,980)  
 POLOWN POLOWN$MIN POLOWN$MAX  POLOWN# 
Mean 0.567 234,386 491,636  3.101 
Median 1.000 1,000 4,767  1.000 
Standard Deviation 0.495 3,208,806 4,714,502  7.741 
10
th
 Percentile 0.000 0 0  0.000 
25
th
 Percentile 0.000 0 0  0.000 
75
th
 Percentile 1.000 21,000 83,125  3.000 
90
th
 Percentile 1.000 251,000 600,000  8.000 
      
Panel B: Firm-year measures of politician ownership when POLOWN = 1 (n=4,525) 
  POLOWN$MIN POLOWN$MAX  POLOWN# 
Mean  413,350 867,018  5.470 
Median  16,000 60,000  2.000 
Standard Deviation  4,252,750 6,235,022  9.630 
10
th
 Percentile  1,000 3,000  1.000 
25
th
 Percentile  2,000 15,000  1.000 
75
th
 Percentile  116,000 302,780  5.000 
90
th
 Percentile  577,741 1,189,724  13.000 
      
Panel C: Firm-year measures of politician ownership when POLOWN = 1 and ownership is distant (n=3,943) 
  POLOWN$MIN POLOWN$MAX  POLOWN# 
Mean  388,582 761,886  4.795 
Median  15,000 50,000  2.000 
Standard Deviation  4,520,125 6,422,916  8.818 
10
th
 Percentile  1,000 2,630  1.000 
25
th
 Percentile  1,805 15,000  1.000 
75
th
 Percentile    91,742              237,047    4.000 
90
th
 Percentile  503,451 1,043,811  10.000 
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Panel D: Firm-year measures of politician ownership when POLOWN = 1 and ownership is local (n= 582) 
  POLOWN$MIN POLOWN$MAX  POLOWN# 
Mean  581,145 1,579,279  10.043 
Median  98,447 254,097  4.000 
Standard Deviation  1,473,023 4,714,062  13.054 
10
th
 Percentile  1,258 15,000  1.000 
25
th
 Percentile  15,000 50,000  2.000 
75
th
 Percentile    375,018              963,673    14.000 
90
th
 Percentile  1,491,568 3,757,657  27.000 
      
Panel E: Firm-year measures of local politician ownership when POLOWN = 1 and ownership is local (n= 582) 
  POLOWN$MIN POLOWN$MAX  POLOWN# 
Mean  127,418 382,260  1.069 
Median  7,844 31,801  1.000 
Standard Deviation  533,270 2,048,241  0.273 
10
th
 Percentile  609 2,000  1.000 
25
th
 Percentile  1,000 15,000  1.000 
75
th
 Percentile    50,000              100,000    1.000 
90
th
 Percentile  250,000 500,000  1.000 
      
 
This table presents summary statistics across the 2005-2011 period based on end of year financial disclosure reports of members of Congress. 
Panel A reports summary statistics at the firm-year level, based on the full sample of S&P 1500 firms. Panel B reports summary statistics only for 
firm-years with some level of politician ownership, and Panels C-E impose additional constraints. Panel C reports summary statistics only for 
firm-years with distant politician ownership, Panel D reports summary statistics only for firm-years with local politician ownership, and Panel E 
reports summary statistics only for the portion of the ownership that relates to a local politician. POLOWN, is defined as an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are owned by at least one member of the U.S. House or Senate at the end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
POLOWN$MIN is measured as the minimum dollar value of equity holdings of the range provided in the financial disclosure reports in firm i at 
year t-1 by all current members of Congress. POLOWN$MAX is measured as the maximum dollar value of equity holdings of the range provided 
in the financial disclosure reports in firm i at year t-1 by all current members of Congress.  POLOWN# is measured as the number of distinct 
current members of Congress with equity investments in firm i at year t-1. All variables are measured at the beginning of the calendar year. 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Politician Owned Firms (POFs) Non-Politician Owned Firms  p-values of the difference 
Variable  Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. Mean Median 
          
NIit  0.034 0.056 0.162 0.014 0.050 0.186 0.00 0.00 
RETit  0.085 0.063 0.415 0.120 0.078 0.512 0.00 0.03 
NEGit  0.415 0.000 0.493 0.414 0.000 0.493 0.93 0.93 
MVit-1  14206 4253 33450 1710 899 3193 0.00 0.00 
MBit-1  3.531 2.500 15.688 2.521 1.888 7.966 0.00 0.00 
LEVit-1  0.368 0.180 0.878 0.377 0.174 0.725 0.63 0.00 
LITit-1  0.324 0.000 0.468 0.306 0.000 0.461 0.09 0.09 
          
N  4,525 3,455   
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix 
  POLOWNit-1 NIit RETit NEGit MVit-1 MBit-1 LEVit-1  
NIit  0.060        
RETit  -0.038 0.202       
NEGit  0.001 -0.178 -0.656      
MVit-1  0.238 0.058 -0.031 -0.009     
MBit-1  0.039 0.019 -0.025 0.022 0.021    
LEVit-1  -0.005 -0.270 0.164 -0.038 -0.039 -0.039   
LITit-1  0.019 -0.018 0.005 0.036 0.004 0.004 -0.125  
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of key variables. In Panel A, t-tests are used to test for differences in means 
and Wilcoxon two-sample tests are used to test for differences in medians. In Panel B, bold text indicates significance at the 0.05 level or better, 
two-tailed. POLOWNit-1 =Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are owned by at least one member of the U.S. House or Senate at the end 
of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. NIit =Annual income before extraordinary items (IB) of firm i in year t, scaled by the market value of equity 
(CSHO*PRCC_F) of firm i at the end of year t-1. RETit =Buy-and-hold stock returns of firm i in year t. NEGit =Indicator variable equal to 1 if 
RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise. MVit-1 =Market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F) of firm i at the end of year t-1. MBit-1 =Market to book 
ratio (MV/CEQ) of firm i at the end of year t-1. LEVit-1 = Leverage ((DLTT+ DLC) / MV) of firm i at the end of year t-1. LITit-1 =Indicator 
variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the following industries at the end of year t-1: Biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), 
Computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), Electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), and Retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961), and 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 4 
THE RELATION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM  
AND POLITICIAN OWNERSHIP 
NIit =0 + 1 RETit + 2 NEGit + 3RETit*NEGit + 4POLOWNit-1 + 5RETit* POLOWNit-1 + 6NEGit*POLOWNit-1  + 7RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1  
+8-11CONTROLSit-1 +12-15NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 +16-19RETit*CONTROLSit-1 +20-23RETit*NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 + it                                          (2) 
  Dependent Variable = NIit 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) 
 Predicted 
Sign 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
INTERCEPT  0.047199 0.00 0.050393 0.00 0.047528 0.00 0.051273 0.00 
RETit  0.025255 0.00 0.031964 0.00 0.021841 0.00 0.035697 0.00 
NEGit  0.022018 0.00 0.010845 0.16 0.017618 0.00 0.014420 0.01 
RETit*NEGit + 0.247706 0.00 0.111507 0.00 0.200416 0.00 0.099545 0.00 
POLOWNit-1  0.006537 0.19 0.002899 0.56 0.000221 0.07 -0.000665 0.04 
RETit* POLOWNit-1  -0.003678 0.39 0.007669 0.24 0.001579 0.00 0.002311 0.07 
NEGit*POLOWNit-1  -0.013278 0.01 0.001490 0.77 -0.000885 0.02 -0.000240 0.58 
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 ? -0.130707 0.00 -0.071551 0.00 -0.011916 0.00 -0.010932 0.01 
MVit-1    0.000000 0.02   0.000000 0.00 
RETit*MVit-1    0.000001 0.00   -0.000000 0.68 
NEGit*MVit-1    -0.000000 0.00   -0.000000 0.13 
RETit*NEGit*MVit-1 -   -0.000002 0.00   -0.000000 0.39 
MBit-1    0.000056 0.60   0.000044 0.71 
RETit*MBit-1    -0.000388 0.46   -0.000149 0.81 
NEGit*MBit-1    -0.001249 0.00   -0.001347 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*MBit-1 -   -0.008157 0.00   -0.009728 0.00 
LEVit-1    -0.008611 0.03   -0.006300 0.05 
RETit*LEVit-1    -0.006207 0.29   -0.011064 0.00 
NEGit*LEVit-1    0.010768 0.10   0.007832 0.11 
RETit*NEGit*LEVit-1 +   0.313810 0.00   0.306607 0.00 
LITit-1    -0.004598 0.42   -0.003134 0.60 
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RETit*LITit-1    -0.027725 0.00   -0.029412 0.00 
NEGit*LITit-1    0.000906 0.81   -0.002100 0.62 
RETit*NEGit*LITit-1 +   0.091501 0.00   0.082705 0.00 
          
N  7,690 7,707 7,773 7,721 
Adjusted R
2
  0.21 0.27 0.17 0.25 
The table reports the results of estimating Equation (2) using pooled OLS regressions over 2005-2011. p-values are based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). p-values are one-tailed when sign of the coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed 
otherwise. Outliers are removed using Cook's (1977) distance statistic. 
 
In columns 1 and 2, POLOWNit-1 =Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are owned by at least one member of the U.S. House or Senate 
at the end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. In columns 3 and 4, POLOWNit-1= the total number of distinct members of Congress with equity 
investments in firm i at the end of year t-1. All other variables are as previously defined. 
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TABLE 5 
THE RELATION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM  
AND LOCAL AND DISTANT POLITICIAN OWNERSHIP 
NIit =0 + 1RETit + 2NEGit + 3RETit*NEGit + 4LPOLOWNit-1 + 5RETit* LPOLOWNit-1   
+ 6NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1  + 7RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 + 8DPOLOWNit-1 + 9RETit* DPOLOWNit-1 
 + 10NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 + 11RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 +12-15CONTROLSit-1  
+16-19NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 +20-23RETit*CONTROLSit-1 +23-26RETit*NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 + it             (3)           
  Dependent Variable = NIit 
  (1) (2) 
 Predicted Sign          Coeff.        p-value          Coeff.        p-value 
INTERCEPT  0.047099 0.00 0.049677 0.00 
RETit  0.021839 0.00 0.033094 0.00 
NEGit  0.019157 0.03 0.015058 0.07 
RETit*NEGit + 0.240681 0.00 0.132449 0.00 
LPOLOWNit-1  0.010661 0.09 0.004764 0.36 
RETit*LPOLOWNit-1  -0.001296 0.91 0.005381 0.61 
NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1  -0.019919 0.00 -0.008370 0.02 
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 ? -0.177614 0.00 -0.132130 0.00 
DPOLOWNit-1  0.005421 0.32 0.003864 0.43 
RETit*DPOLOWNit-1  0.001301 0.79 0.003601 0.53 
NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1  -0.007737 0.31 -0.000762 0.88 
RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 ? -0.109335 0.00 -0.076403 0.00 
CONTROLSit-1    Included 
NEGit*CONTROLSit-1    Included 
RETit*CONTROLSit-1    Included 
RETit*NEGit*MVit-1 -   -0.000002 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*MBit-1 -   -0.008112 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*LEVit-1 +   0.310677 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*LITit-1 +   0.087395 0.00 
      
N
 
 7,728 7,710 
Adjusted R
2
  0.20 0.28 
Test of differences between local and distant owners 
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 < RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 0.00  0.00 
The table reports the results of estimating Equation (3) using pooled OLS regressions over 2005-2011. 
Stand-alone control variables and the two-way interactions between controls and NEG or RET are 
included in the estimations but are not reported for brevity. p-values are based on standard errors adjusted 
for clustering on both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). p-values are one-tailed when sign of the coefficient 
is predicted, and two-tailed otherwise. Outliers are removed using Cook's (1977) distance statistic.  
LPOLOWNit-1 =Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are owned by at least one member of the 
U.S. House or Senate who resides over the congressional district in which the firm is headquartered at the 
end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. DPOLOWNit-1 =Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are 
owned by at least one member of the U.S. House or Senate and none of the members of Congress owning 
shares in firm i reside over the congressional district (measured at the state level for the U.S. Senate and 
district level for the U.S. House) in which the firm is headquartered at the end of year t-1, and 0 
otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. 
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TABLE 6 
THE RELATION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM, 
POLITICIAN OWNERSHIP, AND ISSUER CREDIT RATINGS  
 
  Dependent Variable = NIit 
  (1) (2) 
  
 
       
       Coeff. 
       
p-value 
          
Coeff. 
        
p-value 
INTERCEPT       0.045195 0.00 0.043720 0.00 
RETit  0.033987 0.00 0.034721 0.00 
NEGit  0.013127 0.02 0.015088 0.01 
RETit*NEGit + 0.136076 0.00 0.136476 0.00 
POLOWNit-1  0.000139 0.98   
RETit*POLOWNit-1  0.003783 0.55   
NEGit*POLOWNit-1  -0.003414 0.53   
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit- ? -0.078547 0.00   
LPOLOWNit-1    0.000184 0.97 
RETit*LPOLOWNit-1    0.001070 0.92 
NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1    -0.008488 0.03 
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 ?   -0.091293 0.00 
DPOLOWNit-1    -0.000332 0.95 
RETit*DPOLOWNit-1    0.003531 0.60 
NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1    -0.001099 0.84 
RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 ?   -0.068909 0.00 
RATINGit-1  0.015948 0.00 0.017753 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1*RATINGit-1 - -0.021881 0.04   
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1*RATINGit-1 -   -0.044007 0.06 
RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1*RATINGit-1 -   -0.022900 0.01 
     
CONTROLSit-1  Included Included 
NEGit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included 
RETit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included 
RET*NEGit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included 
      
N
 
 7,709 7,705 
Adjusted R
2
  0.26 0.27 
 
The table reports the results of estimating Equations (2) and (3) using pooled OLS regressions over 2005-
2011. Stand-alone control variables, the two-way interactions between controls and NEG or RET, and the 
three-way interactions with RET*NEG are included in the estimations but are not reported for brevity. p-
values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering on both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). p-
values are one-tailed when sign of the coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed otherwise. Outliers are 
removed using Cook's (1977) distance statistic. 
RATINGit-1=Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i has an S&P long-term issuer credit rating at the end of 
year t-1, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. 
 
85 
 
TABLE 7 
THE RELATION BETWEEN UNCONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM  
AND POLITICIAN OWNERSHIP 
CONACCit =0 + 1POLOWNit-1 + 2MVit-1  + 3MBit-1 + 4LEVit-1  + 5LITit-1 + 6CFOit-1+ it                (4) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
INTERCEPT ? 0.001155 0.73 0.000523 0.86 0.001377 0.68 
POLOWNit-1 ? -0.002326 0.13 -0.000171 0.17   
LPOLOWNit-1 ?     -0.005808 0.01 
DPOLOWNit-1 ?     -0.002437 0.16 
MVit-1 - -0.000000 0.00 -0.000000 0.17 -0.000000 0.01 
MBit-1 - 0.000134 0.06 0.000139 0.05 0.000135 0.07 
LEVit-1 + -0.002459 0.02 -0.002459 0.03 -0.002478 0.02 
LITit-1 + 0.014111 0.00 0.013966 0.00 0.014212 0.00 
CFOit-1 + 0.114704 0.00 0.116105                   0.00 0.113790 0.00 
Test of differences between local and distant owners      
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 < RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1   0.00 
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N  7,546 7,570 7,541 
Adjusted R
2
  0.12 0.12 0.12 
 
The table reports the results of estimating Equations (4) using pooled OLS regressions over 2005-2011. The dependent variable in all three 
columns is CONACCit, defined as income before extraordinary items less cash flow from operations plus depreciation expense deflated 
by average total assets, and averaged over the previous three years, multiplied by negative one. CFOit-1 is equal to cash flow from 
operations deflated by market value. In columns 1, POLOWNit-1 =Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are owned by at least one 
member of the U.S. House or Senate at the end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. In columns 2, POLOWNit-1= the total number of distinct members of 
Congress with equity investments in firm i at the end of year t-1.. All other variables are defined in Table 3. In columns 3, LPOLOWNit-1 
=Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are owned by at least one member of the U.S. House or Senate who resides over the congressional 
district in which the firm is headquartered at the end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. DPOLOWNit-1 =Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares 
are owned by at least one member of the U.S. House or Senate and none of the members of Congress owning shares in firm i reside over the 
congressional district (measured at the state level for the U.S. Senate and district level for the U.S. House) in which the firm is headquartered at the 
end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. 
 
p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering on both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). p-values are one-tailed when sign of the 
coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed otherwise. Outliers are removed using Cook's (1977) distance statistic. 
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TABLE 8 
THE RELATION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM AND POLITICIAN 
OWNERSHIP AFTER CONROLLING FOR MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
INTERCEPT  0.050888 0.00 0.049785 0.00 0.046164 0.00 
RETit  0.032007 0.00 0.034219 0.00 0.032114 0.00 
NEGit  0.017498 0.02 0.020883 0.00 0.016592 0.00 
RETit*NEGit + 0.141579 0.00 0.155325 0.00 0.156259 0.00 
POLOWNit-1  0.001272 0.79   -0.002012 0.66 
LPOLOWNit-1    0.003861 0.47   
DPOLOWNit-1    0.001917 0.71   
RETit* POLOWNit-1  0.011429 0.09   0.008994 0.16 
RETit* LPOLOWNit-1    0.005897 0.61   
RETit* DPOLOWNit-1    0.007370 0.29   
NEGit*POLOWNit-1  -0.002149 0.68   -0.004429 0.44 
NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1    -0.012357 0.00   
NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1    -0.002826 0.63   
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 ? -0.101178 0.00   -0.098675 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 ?   -0.154359                     0.00   
RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 ?   -0.098477                     0.00   
CEOOWNit-1        -0.000144 0.19      -0.000068     0.58   0.000004       0.97 
CONTROLSit-1  Included Included Included 
NEGit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included Included 
RETit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included Included 
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RETit*NEGit*MVit-1 - -0.000002 0.00 -0.000002 0.00 -0.000002 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*MBit-1 - -0.007916 0.00 -0.008677 0.00 -0.007848 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*LEVit-1 + 0.311347 0.00 0.296967 0.00 0.283816 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*LITit-1 + 0.087281 0.00 0.091602 0.00 0.061906 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*CEOWNit-1 - -0.002995 0.00 -0.003150 0.00 -0.002752 0.00 
RATINGit-1        ?     0.016348                       0.00 
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1* 
RATINGit-1 
       -                                   -0.016822                      0.08 
     
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 < RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 0.00  
     
N  7,583 7,588 7,577 
Adjusted R
2
  0.28 0.29 0.27 
 
The table reports the results of estimating Equations (2) and (3) using pooled OLS regressions over 2005-2011. CEOWNit-1 is equal to the 
percentage of the firm’s equity owned by its CEO. All other variables are as previous defined. p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for 
clustering on both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). p-values are one-tailed when sign of the coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed otherwise. 
Outliers are removed using Cook's (1977) distance statistic. 
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TABLE 9 
THE RELATION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM  
MEASURED USING THE EARNINGS-CHANGE MODEL AND 
POLITICIAN OWNERSHIP 
NIit+1 =0 +  + 2NEGit + 3 it*NEGit + 4POLOWNit-1 + 5 it*POLOWNit-1 + 6NEGit*POLOWNit-
1 + 7 it*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 +8-11CONTROLSit-1  +12-15NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 +16-19 it*CONTROLSit-1 
+20-23 it*NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 + it                                           (5) 
   Dependent Variable = NIit+1 
   (1) (2) 
  Predicted 
Sign 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
INTERCEPT   -0.002385 0.77 -0.003956 0.63 
 it   0.023614 0.49 0.030648 0.46 
NEGit   -0.025010 0.00 -0.022991 0.00 
it*NEGit  - -0.867116 0.00 -0.835107 0.00 
POLOWNit-1   -0.001399 0.43 0.000085 0.43 
it* POLOWNit-1   0.002178 0.87 -0.000312 0.86 
NEGit*POLOWNit-1   0.007334 0.04 0.000968 0.07 
 it*NEGit*POLOWNit-1  ? 0.117944 0.15 0.033540 0.08 
CONTROLSit-1   Included Included 
NEGit*CONTROLSit-1   Included Included 
it *CONTROLSit-1   Included Included 
 it*NEGit*CONTROLSit-1   Included Included 
N   6,108 6,124 
Adjusted R2   0.19 0.18 
 
The table reports the results of estimating Equation (5) using pooled OLS regressions over 2005-2011. Stand-alone 
control variables and the two-way interactions between controls and NEG or  as well as the three way 
interactions between control variables and NEG and  are included in the estimations but are not reported for 
brevity. p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering on both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). p-
values are one-tailed when sign of the coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed otherwise. Outliers are removed using 
Cook's (1977) distance statistic. In columns 1, POLOWNit-1 =Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are 
owned by at least one member of the U.S. House or Senate at the end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. In column 2, 
POLOWNit-1= the total number of distinct members of Congress with equity investments in firm i at the end of 
year t-1. = Change in annual net income before extraordinary items (IB) of firm i from year t to t+1, scaled 
by total assets (AT) at the end of year t. = Change in annual net income before extraordinary items (IB) of 
firm i from year t-1 to t, scaled by total assets (AT) at the end of year t-1. NEGit =Indicator variable equal to 1 if 
is negative, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. 
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TABLE 10 
THE RELATION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM,  
MEASURED USING THE PIECEWISE LINEAR RELATION 
BETWEEN ACCRUALS AND CASH FLOWS, AND POLITICIAN 
OWNERSHIP 
ACCit =0 + 1CFOit + 2DCFOit + 3CFOit*DCFOit + 4POLOWNit-1 + 5CFOit* POLOWNit-  
+ 6DCFOit*POLOWNit-1 + 7CFOit*DCFOit*POLOWNit-1 +8-11CONTROLSit-1 +12-15CFOit*CONTROLSit-1 
+16-19DCFOit*CONTROLSit-1 +20-23CFOit*DCFOit*CONTROLSit-1 + it             (6) 
   Dependent Variable = ACCit 
   (1) (2) 
  Predicted 
Sign 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
INTERCEPT   -0.011060 0.21 -0.011492 0.19 
CFO it  - -0.353958 0.00 -0.328409 0.00 
DCFOit   0.002948 0.72 0.013268 0.21 
CFO it* DCFOit  + 0.027960 0.37 -0.005362 0.95 
POLOWNit-1   0.003508 0.36 -0.000333 0.39 
CFOit* POLOWNit-1   0.030224 0.17 0.004265 0.04 
DCFOit*POLOWNit-1   0.013108 0.26 -0.002169 0.75 
CFO it* DCFOit*POLOWNit-1  + 0.215105 0.14 -0.014335 0.94 
CONTROLSit-1   Included Included 
CFOit*CONTROLSit-1   Included Included 
DCFOit *CONTROLSit-1   Included Included 
CFO it* DCFOit*CONTROLSit-1   Included Included 
N   6,967 7,004 
Adjusted R2   0.27 0.25 
The table reports the results of estimating Equation (6) using pooled OLS regressions over 2005-2011. Stand-alone 
control variables and the two-way interactions between controls and CFO or DCFO, as well as the three way 
interactions between control variables and CFO and DCFO are included in the estimations but are not reported for 
brevity. p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering on both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). p-
values are one-tailed when sign of the coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed otherwise. Outliers are removed using 
Cook's (1977) distance statistic. In columns 1, POLOWNit-1 =Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are 
owned by at least one member of the U.S. House or Senate at the end of year t-1, and 0 otherwise. In column 2, 
POLOWNit-1= the total number of distinct members of Congress with equity investments in firm i at the end of 
year t-1. ACCit = is accruals scaled by beginning total assets (AT). Accruals are defined as earnings before 
exceptional items and extraordinary item (IB) is minus cash flows from operations (OCANF).CFOit = is cash flows 
from operations (OCANF) scaled by beginning total assets (AT).DCFOit = is an indicator variable equal to one if 
CFO is negative, and zero otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined.
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TABLE 11 
THE RELATION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM  
AND LEAD, CONCURRENT, AND LAGGED POLITICIAN 
OWNERSHIP 
NIit =0 + 1RETit + 2NEGit + 3RETit*NEGit + 4POLOWNit-1 + 5RETit* POLOWNit-1   
+ 6NEGit*POLOWNit-1  + 7RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 + 8POLOWNit + 9RETit* POLOWNit 
 + 10NEGit*POLOWNit + 11RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit + 12POLOWNit+1 + 13RETit* POLOWNit+1   
+ 14NEGit*POLOWNit+1  + 15RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit+1 + 16-19CONTROLSit-1  
+20-23NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 +24-27RETit*CONTROLSit-1 +28-31RETit*NEGit*CONTROLSit-1 + it             (7)           
  Dependent Variable = NIit 
  (1) (2) 
 Predicted Sign          Coeff.        p-value          Coeff.        p-value 
INTERCEPT  0.046522 0.00 0.053191 0.00 
RETit  0.027462 0.00 0.022731 0.00 
NEGit  0.011713 0.26 0.009989 0.04 
RETit*NEGit + 0.134655 0.00 0.115067 0.00 
POLOWNit-1  0.005751 0.30 0.000245 0.67 
RETit*POLOWNit-1  -0.016182 0.17 -0.006396 0.00 
NEGit*POLOWNit-1  -0.015287 0.00 -0.003448 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 ? -0.057410 0.01 -0.010590 0.00 
POLOWNit  0.004926 0.23 -0.001544 0.01 
RETit*POLOWNit  0.007812 0.16 0.010598 0.00 
NEGit*POLOWNit  0.006118 0.49 0.004482 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit ? 0.027727 0.16 0.005020 0.22 
POLOWNit+1  0.000877 0.89 0.001718 0.00 
RETit*POLOWNit+1  0.008286 0.53 -0.004357 0.00 
NEGit*POLOWNit+1  0.007017 0.51 -0.001607 0.13 
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit+1 ? -0.021124 0.70 0.000274 0.97 
    
CONTROLSit-1  Included Included 
NEGit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included 
RETit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included 
NEGit*RETi*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included 
      
N
 
 5,582 5,597 
Adjusted R
2
  0.18 0.19 
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The table reports the results of estimating Equation (6) using pooled OLS regressions over 2005-2010. 
Stand-alone control variables, the two-way interactions between controls and NEG or RET, and the three-
way interactions with RET*NEG are included in the estimations but are not reported for brevity. p-values 
are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering on both firm and year (Petersen, 2009). p-values are 
one-tailed when sign of the coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed otherwise. Outliers are removed using 
Cook's (1977) distance statistic.  
In column 1, POLOWN =Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s shares are owned by at least one member 
of the U.S. House or Senate at the end of the year mentioned in subscript, and 0 otherwise. In column 2, 
POLOWN= the total number of distinct members of Congress with equity investments in firm i at the end 
of the year mentioned in subscript. All other variables are as previously defined 
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TABLE 12 
CHANGE IN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM PRIOR TO, CONCURRENT WITH,  
AND AFTER THE CHANGE IN POLITICIAN OWNERSHIP 
NIit =0 + 1RETit + 2NEGit + 3RETit*NEGit             (1) 
Panel A: Basu Coefficient Estimates 
 Mean Change in POLOWN Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 
Ownership Decrease (n = 1,152) -2.05 0.055330 0.059073 0.074159 0.146110 
      
No Change (n =2,169) 0 0.114064 0.143085 0.177144 0.257117 
      
Ownership Increase (n = 969) 1.78 0.086342 0.067450 0.093864 0.128462 
      
Panel B: Within Group Test of Differences 
  Pre-Change Period Difference 
(Year t-2, Year t-1) 
Concurrent Change Period 
Difference (Year t-1, Year t) 
 Post Change Period Difference 
(Year t, Year t+1) 
Ownership Decrease             0.003743 0.015086  0.071951 
p-value  0.87 0.50  0.01 
No Change   0.029021 0.034059  0.079973 
p-value  0.07 0.04  0.00 
Ownership Increase  -0.018892 0.026414   0.034598 
p-value  0.48 0.35  0.28 
      
Panel C: Across Group Tests of Differences 
  Pre-Change Period Difference 
(Year t-2, Year t-1) 
Concurrent Change Period 
Difference (Year t-1, Year t) 
 Post Change Period Difference 
(Year t, Year t+1) 
Decrease –Increase  0.022635 -0.011328  0.037353 
p-value  0.57 0.79  0.40 
      
This table reports the results of estimating Equation (1) for each of three groups and three periods over 2005-2011. Panel A presents the Basu 
coefficients for each of the periods by group, where groups are formed by examining changes in politician ownership from the prior year. Panels B 
and C test whether the time-series average of the difference in the coefficient estimates is different from zero. p-values are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm-level clustering (Petersen, 2009), and are reported below the coefficient estimates. p-values are one-tailed when sign of the 
coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed otherwise. Outliers are removed using Cook's (1977) distance statistic.  
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TABLE 13 
THE RELATION BETWEEN CONSERVATISM AND POLITICIAN OWNERSHIP USING 
FIRM-LEVEL CLUSTERING OF STANDARD ERRORS 
Panel A: Conditional Conservatism 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
INTERCEPT  0.050393 0.00 0.049677 0.00 0.045195 0.00 
RETit  0.031964 0.00 0.033094 0.00 0.033987 0.00 
NEGit  0.010845 0.05 0.015058 0.00 0.013127 0.02 
RETit*NEGit + 0.111507 0.00 0.132449 0.00 0.136078 0.00 
POLOWNit-1  0.002899 0.36   0.000139 0.97 
LPOLOWNit-1    0.004764 0.32   
DPOLOWNit-1    0.003864 0.24   
RETit* POLOWNit-1  0.007669 0.30   0.003783 0.62 
RETit* LPOLOWNit-1    0.005381 0.63   
RETit* DPOLOWNit-1    0.003601 0.64   
NEGit*POLOWNit-1  0.001490 0.78   -0.003414 0.51 
NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1    -0.008370 0.27   
NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1    -0.000762 0.89   
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 ? -0.071551 0.00   -0.078547 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 ?   -0.132130                     0.00   
RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 ?   -0.076403                     0.00   
CONTROLSit-1  Included Included Included 
NEGit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included Included 
RETit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included Included 
RETit*NEGit*MVit-1 - -0.000002 0.00 -0.000002 0.00 -0.000002 0.00 
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RETit*NEGit*MBit-1 - -0.008157 0.00 -0.008112 0.00 -0.007736 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*LEVit-1 + 0.313810 0.00 0.310677 0.00 0.284591 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*LITit-1 + 0.091501 0.00 0.087395 0.00 0.067184 0.00 
RATINGit-1        ?      0.015948                      0.00 
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1* 
RATINGit-1 
       -                                   -0.021881                      0.08 
     
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 < RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 0.00  
     
N  7,707 7,710 7,709 
Adjusted R
2
  0.27 0.28 0.26 
Panel B: Unconditional Conservatism 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
INTERCEPT ? 0.001155 0.32 0.000523 0.86 0.001377 0.24 
POLOWNit-1 ? -0.002326 0.05 -0.000171 0.09   
LPOLOWNit-1 ?     -0.005808 0.00 
DPOLOWNit-1 ?     -0.002437 0.04 
MVit-1 - -0.000000 0.00 -0.000000 0.14 -0.000000 0.00 
MBit-1 - 0.000134 0.02 0.000139 0.02 0.000135 0.03 
LEVit-1 + -0.002459 0.02 -0.002459 0.02 -0.002478 0.02 
LITit-1 + 0.014111 0.00 0.013966 0.00 0.014212 0.00 
CFOit-1 + 0.114704 0.00  0.116105                    0.00 0.113790 0.00 
        
N  7,546 7,570 7,541 
Adjusted R
2
  0.12 0.12 0.12 
96 
 
The table reports the results of estimating Equations (2), (3), and (4) using pooled OLS regressions over 2005-2011. p-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for clustering on firm (Petersen, 2009). p-values are one-tailed when sign of the coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed 
otherwise. Outliers are removed using Cook's (1977) distance statistic. 
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TABLE 14 
THE RELATION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM AND POLITICIAN 
OWNERSHIP INCLUDING FIRM AND YEAR FIXED EFFECTS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
INTERCEPT  0.079278 0.00 0.079267 0.00 0.073993 0.01 
RETit  0.036083 0.00 0.036158 0.00 0.035842 0.00 
NEGit  0.016441 0.01 0.016415 0.01 0.016532 0.01 
RETit*NEGit + 0.089886 0.00 0.089615 0.00 0.092639 0.00 
POLOWNit-1  -0.003222 0.40   -0.003038 0.42 
LPOLOWNit-1    -0.006300 0.30   
DPOLOWNit-1    -0.002774 0.47   
RETit* POLOWNit-1  -0.000839 0.93   -0.000965 0.92 
RETit* LPOLOWNit-1    0.000046 0.99   
RETit* DPOLOWNit-1    -0.001047 0.92   
NEGit*POLOWNit-1  0.001089 0.86   0.000600 0.92 
NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1    -0.007133 0.39   
NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1    0.002111 0.74   
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1 ? -0.051182 0.04   -0.045264 0.09 
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 ?   -0.112037                     0.00   
RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 ?    -0.042643                    0.10   
CONTROLSit-1  Included Included Included 
NEGit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included Included 
RETit*CONTROLSit-1  Included Included Included 
RETit*NEGit*MVit-1 - -0.000001 0.01 -0.000001 0.01 -0.000001 0.01 
RETit*NEGit*MBit-1 - -0.008680 0.00 -0.008728 0.00 -0.008603 0.00 
98 
 
RETit*NEGit*LEVit-1 + 0.189476 0.00 0.189319 0.00 0.186634 0.00 
RETit*NEGit*LITit-1 + 0.078763 0.00 0.079362 0.00 0.071833 0.01 
RATINGit-1        ?     0.005282                       0.42 
RETit*NEGit*POLOWNit-1* 
RATINGit-1 
       -                                   -0.014676                      0.19 
     
RETit*NEGit*LPOLOWNit-1 < RETit*NEGit*DPOLOWNit-1 0.00  
     
Firm Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
N  7,666 7,672 7,663 
Adjusted R
2
  0.68 0.65 0.64 
The table reports the results of estimating Equations (2) and (3) using pooled OLS regressions over 2005-2011. p-values are based on standard 
errors adjusted for clustering on firm (Petersen, 2009). p-values are one-tailed when sign of the coefficient is predicted, and two-tailed otherwise. 
Outliers are removed using Cook's (1977) distance statistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
